Elements of causality in Hume with a view to a possible debate with Kant
Keywords:
Understanding, Causality, ImaginationAbstract
In his Critique of Pure Reason, in the Second Analogy of Experience, Kant intends to refute Hume’s solution for the cause and effect problem. There he claims that the cause and effect relationship is a necessary condition of experience and, thus, an objectively rather than subjectively constituted experience. This is a direct response to what has been characterized as the core of Hume’ conclusion, according to which this relationship originates from a simple subjective need. However, the problem raised by Hume also contains another dimension that is usually characterized as the “problem of induction”. In this respect, commentators of Kant’s philosophy diverge on whether he responded ho Hume’s philosophy also in the Second Analogy or relied directly on the arguments put forward in the Critique of Judgment. A discussion of this topic involves several issues: As far as Kant’s philosophy is concerned, issues such as whether the principle “the same effects from the same causes” is a consequence of the principle “every event has a cause” require a closer look. However, this article intends to point out some aspects of Hume’s philosophy that may have determined Kant’s response to the problems it raised and even to consider the possibility of defending the consistency of Hume’s philosophy over against Kant’s alleged refutation of it. Thus, it will discuss topics such as the mutual implication between the problems of causality and induction, the natural and philosophical definitions of cause, the status of habit and the difference between habit as such and the particular habits based on it, as well as the presence of a reflection judgment in Hume, in order to more adequately ponder about the actual meaning of Hume’s analysis of cause and effect.Downloads
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