Hume’s empiricist-analogical response to the problem of natural religion

Abstract

In one of his greatest works, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume proposes to apply to religion criteria that are as adequate and sound as those found in natural philosophy. For this purpose, he undertakes a profound analysis of the basic assumptions underlying religious knowledge. He concludes that since religious criteria are not proved by experience, they have no significance for the grounding of a natural religion. His intention in the adoption of such strict principles for human nature seems to entail a problem, as it necessarily leads one to ask whether these principles, which are as strong and dogmatic as those found in the religious realm, would make it possible to validate theological arguments. Hume’s solution lies in the analogies of thought derived from the experience perceived by our senses. Thus, this article intends to show that, although Hume does not admit the tacit use of the word “analogy” as it is found in tradition, he uses analogy several times in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion in order to validate knowledge originated from theological discourse.