Hume and justice as an artificial virtue

Abstract

Hume’s distinction between “natural” and “artificial” virtues is well-known. Hume employed this distinction in the Treatise for the sake of highlighting his claims against the possibility of a natural motivation for the practice of justice. Just acts presuppose a sense of obligation, aroused by the consideration of the general utility of the system of laws and rules that promote and enforce citizen’s rights, notably their property rights. Contrasted to the first-order motives represented by the natural virtues, just actions have only “second-order” motives. However, in spite of the justice system rules being conventionally derived, it is implausible that the motivations for the performance of acts in conformity to those rules are “artificially” engendered too, that is, engendered only secondarily inasmuch as we become capable of making up some complex ideas by reflection. If it would be true, we would not have a plausible explanation for some ordinary examples of obedience and conformity to justice. Moreover, individuals that are not motivated by any kind of moral sense, like the free rider and the sensible knave, can also acknowledge laws’ social utility. In this essay, I will analyze some of the main difficulties faced by Hume’s explanations for his first distinction.