Passion and natural interest in the Hume’s investigation on justice

Abstract

This article discusses Hume’s thesis that human beings cannot be indifferent to the morals game and express their interest not only in their own action, but also in the action of others, through the natural instinct of sympathy and benevolence for others. On the basis of this observation, it tries to show how the sentiment of sympathy directs and unfolds through the moral qualities listed by Hume, including artificial virtues such as justice. Thus, the text revolves around three axes of argument: (i) to explaining the feeling of sympathy and the role of passions in the formulation of moral judgments about good and evil, pointing out that moral virtues are formed on the basis of public utility; (ii) to show that the skeptical conjecture of selfishness cannot be sustained and that self-interest--the “interest of imagination”--is not the sole ground of moral distinction, stressing that the happiness of others is perceived by human nature as something agreeable to one’s own interest, in order to finally (iii) conclude that regardless of any artifice human being is naturally benevolent and humanitarian principles are manifested in their nature before the emergence of the contract or even of the sense of justice.