Abstraction as methodology

Chomsky and the theoretical boundaries of embodied cognition

Abstract

This article aims to identify Chomsky’s position regarding embodied cognition, showing how his counterpoints can contribute to a more nuanced debate in the philosophy of cognitive science. The analysis unfolds in three stages: examining how Chomsky’s perspective on cognition aligns with so-called classic cognitivism as commonly interpreted by embodied cognition theorists; identifying which embodied conceptions he preemptively questioned; and demonstrating that such objections anchor in methodological naturalism and biological “truism”. We interpret that Chomsky would view minimal embodiment (ME) as raising concerns about triviality unless it formulates a precise concept of body; full embodiment (FE) as conflicting with poverty of stimulus arguments for cognitive acquisition; and radical embodiment (RE) as epistemically problematic due to its rejection of mental representations. We further argue that Chomsky’s epistemological stance encourages embodied cognition to rely on theoretical abstractions for explanatory power, specifically through a moderate approach framing embodied cognitive capacities as coextensive with sets of bodily codes or formats. This approach avoids reductionism while enabling testable hypotheses about bodily-influenced cognition, thus answering Chomsky’s enduring challenge to formulate nontrivial claims about what is embodied in cognition.