Ronald Dworkin's criticism of John Rawls's political constructivism

Foundations for a new defense of equalitary liberalism

Abstract

The article intends to present Ronald Dworkin's analysis of the idea of ​​original position in John Rawls' theory of justice, Rawls' subsequent exposition of his political constructivism, and, finally, Dworkin's new considerations on the matter, in his late work, when he becomes a critic of political constructivism and a defender of moral truth, in defense of egalitarian liberalism, which will be sustained as a more consistent defense of this perspective. To this end, it will initially be shown on which points Dworkin agreed or disagreed with the Rawlsian contractualist idea, in 1973, based on the essay Justice and Rights. Next, John Rawls' exposition on the philosophical bases of his theory of justice will be discussed, based on Conference III of his Political Liberalism, from 1993, including responding to Dworkin. Finally, the article shows Dworkin's turn in 2011, in the book Justice for Hedgehogs, when the author criticizes metaethics and Rawlsian political constructivism, now defending liberal and democratic principles as objective truths.