A matter of judgment

Arendt and Kant, between imagination and understanding

Abstract

We present Arendt's interpretation of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgment in constructing what she referred to as the activity of judging. Our starting point is centered on the inquiries raised by Arendt following the Eichmann trial, addressing the superficiality of the Nazi official's thinking. As a hypothesis, we propose that Eichmann's reflective gap stems from a lack of integration between understanding and imagination, which is capable of facilitating an "enlarged" or "broadened" thinking, characteristics of the Kantian faculty of judgment. Furthermore, this article aims to analyze the convergence between Kant's aesthetic judgment and Arendt's activity of judging to construct independent thinking and autonomous judgment. To this end, the works of both authors will be analyzed, focusing on the conception of aesthetic judgment and the formation of broadened thinking. We conclude that the subjectivity and freedom of thought promoted by Kantian aesthetic judgment, if applied as proposed by Arendt, provide an alternative in situations where norms and rules are insufficient to guide judgment.