The destruction of the Demolition of Reason:

the fundamental problems in Lukács' critique of Heidegger's ontology

Abstract

This article intends to carry out, within its limitations, a critical analysis of György Lukács' interpretation of the fundamental aspects of Martin Heidegger's Fundamental Ontology. In the work we will analyze, recently translated into Portuguese as “A Destruição da Razão” (The Destruction of Reason), there is a laborious critique of the history of metaphysics. Being and Time, which in the history of philosophy has ambitions with little resemblance, joins those texts that receive the most attention in the assessment made by the Marxist thinker. Thus, alluding to the Destruktion movement, the article aims to put into play the first part of the critique of Heidegger's hermeneutic ontology and contrastively verify the most fundamental problems of this reception regarding the understanding of the phenomenological paradigm. Therefore, by examining Lukács' ontology of Social-Being, which is presented in the work as a sketch still in its initial elaboration, this work intends to begin the examination of the ontological-philosophical consistency of the critique.