Connection point and rule of law in the debate's Waldron vs. Dworkin

Abstract

This paper proposes an investigation of the "debate" Waldron vs. Dworkin and the question of moral disagreements. With regard to questions of moral disagreements and the judicial review, Waldron released severe criticism at the moral epistemology imposed by Dworkin, arguing that the "last word" should be from the Legislative. In this scenario, I propose a defense to Dworkin’s conception, coming to the conclusion that (i) the authors, in fact, do not have a disagreement in themselves, but connection points, according to which (ii) deference to legislators is only possible when there is a properly solid and coherent democracy, which is not the case with the historical and contemporary narrative. The deductive "method" was used, conducted under a bibliographical research, adopting as theoretical frameworks the "discussion" held by philosophers for this essay.