On the intentionality-relative features of the world

Autores/as

  • Rodrigo A. dos S. Gouvea Universidade Federal de São João del-Rei

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2016.172.09

Resumen

Many things we deal with in our daily lives seem to be products of our mental, intentional states. John Searle (1996, 2010) defended this thesis, and offered a characterization of the “intentionality-relative features of the world”. The present paper aims at contributing to our understanding of the nature of such entities. It presents and criticises Searle’s claims on the general properties of the intentionality-relative features of the world. An original characterization is offered in the paper, as a consequence of modifications I suggest making to Searle’s account, mainly in respect to the epistemological status of such entities.

Keywords: intentionality, intentionality-relative features of the world, ontological subjectivity, epistemological objectivity.

Descargas

Los datos de descargas todavía no están disponibles.

Biografía del autor/a

Rodrigo A. dos S. Gouvea, Universidade Federal de São João del-Rei

Since 2014 I am professor of philosophy at the Universidade Federal de São João del-Rei (Brazil), working in the Departamento de Filosofia e Métodos. I got my Dr. phil from the Universität Leipzig (Germany) in 2014.

Descargas

Publicado

2016-09-20

Cómo citar

GOUVEA, R. A. dos S. On the intentionality-relative features of the world. Filosofia Unisinos / Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, São Leopoldo, v. 17, n. 2, p. 149–154, 2016. DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2016.172.09. Disponível em: https://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2016.172.09. Acesso em: 10 may. 2025.

Número

Sección

Philosophy South