On the intentionality-relative features of the world

Authors

  • Rodrigo A. dos S. Gouvea Universidade Federal de São João del-Rei

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2016.172.09

Abstract

Many things we deal with in our daily lives seem to be products of our mental, intentional states. John Searle (1996, 2010) defended this thesis, and offered a characterization of the “intentionality-relative features of the world”. The present paper aims at contributing to our understanding of the nature of such entities. It presents and criticises Searle’s claims on the general properties of the intentionality-relative features of the world. An original characterization is offered in the paper, as a consequence of modifications I suggest making to Searle’s account, mainly in respect to the epistemological status of such entities.

Keywords: intentionality, intentionality-relative features of the world, ontological subjectivity, epistemological objectivity.

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Author Biography

Rodrigo A. dos S. Gouvea, Universidade Federal de São João del-Rei

Since 2014 I am professor of philosophy at the Universidade Federal de São João del-Rei (Brazil), working in the Departamento de Filosofia e Métodos. I got my Dr. phil from the Universität Leipzig (Germany) in 2014.

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Published

2016-09-20

How to Cite

GOUVEA, R. A. dos S. On the intentionality-relative features of the world. Filosofia Unisinos / Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, São Leopoldo, v. 17, n. 2, p. 149–154, 2016. DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2016.172.09. Disponível em: https://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2016.172.09. Acesso em: 10 may. 2025.

Issue

Section

Philosophy South