The Hegelian concept of freedom as being with oneself in one’s other
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4013/5001Abstract
The article sets forth the Hegelian concept of freedom – being with oneself in one’s other – in the unity of its two faces: (a) the self-referent subjective face, through which free will remains in itself, and (b) the heteroreferent objective face, through which freedom is not exclusive nor excluding, but is also referred to its other. This analysis will be conducted on the basis of the 5th, 6th and 7th paragraphs of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, which introduce free will according to a synthetic conceptual structure, but whose clarification makes possible a more comprehensive understanding of the Hegelian concept of freedom.
Key words: Hegelianism, freedom, free will, otherness.
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