Against Hypothetical Common Sense

A Naturalistic Critique of the Common Sense in the Philosophy of Consciousness

Abstract

This paper offers a methodological critique of the material use of philosophical thought experiments and the common sense as evidence in the philosophy of consciousness. As such, I will use Farkas’ (2013) paper as a case study. I argue that these kinds of evidence, when used to support metaphysical claims about the nature of conscious states, rely on epistemically unstable judgments that lack sufficient empirical grounding. Drawing on recent findings from experimental philosophy and the social psychology, I propose a moderate restrictionist position, i.e., while not rejecting the method of cases wholesale, we ought to suspend judgment on conclusions drawn fromremote scenarios, particularly in domains where intuitive responses have proven highly variable and culturally contingent. Moreover, I introduce a distinction between objective and hypothetical common sense, arguing that Farkas's appeal to commonsense linguistic practice commits an error. The case study serves to illustrate broader concerns about the evidentiary role of a priori intuition and common sense in theorizing about consciousness. I conclude that methodological caution is warranted in the use of material thought experiments and common sense and that future work should prioritize empirically constrained approaches.