The sayable ethic to the unsayable ethic: a possible path

Abstract

The current article discuss the opposition and the overlap between Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889-1951) and Jacques Lacan’s (1901-1981) ethical propositions. Starting from the analysis of what we denominate the unsayable ethic enounced in the Tratactus logico-philosophicus (1921) in its last aphorism: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”, we propose that silence is represented by the space between what is sayable and what is unsayable. According to Lacan, based on what he affirms in L’ètourdit (1973), “That is to be said remains forgotten behind what is said in what is heard”, if the function of psychoanalysis is to make one hear the truth, therefore it faces two poles: the unsayable represented by the Real, which, instead of making one be silent, leads one to having to speak, even if his speech remains forgotten. This counterpoint is denominated Lacanian as being a tributary sayable ethic, like the Wittgenstenian’s ethic, of the impossibility of enunciate everything.