The perspectivism of perceptual experience and relationship between body and soul in Merleau-Ponty

Abstract

Against the idea that objects are because of some kind of perception, Merleau-Ponty believes that perspectivism of perceptual experience does not refer to a deformation of the real, in the sense of a relativistic limitation of knowledge. Despite the irreducibility of the lived world, the seizure of profiles is one of its possible manifestations, other words, the perspective of a given object is the object itself, which does not mean ignoring its transcendence. The perspectivism of perceptual experience according to naive consciousness absorbed by goes against empiricism in the sense that it is not about a relationship outside tied to certain states of consciousness, and against intellectualism, to the extent that the general notion of the object is not obtained a composition representations the order of judgment. The point is to try to explain how the perception of the object occurs once only if it it possesses a profile in a way that escape logic associationist by which there would be some kind of causal action of thing in relation to the subject and that also is not the intellectualist way of a compound of mental representations from one side of the object perceived.