The distinction between 'feeling' and 'experience' in Hume’s moral philosophy

Abstract

The article discusses a problem of interpretation (and also of translation) of Hume’s moral writings, viz. the distinction between “feeling” and “experiencing”. It starts from the suspicion that there is a certain interpretive “stylistic flaw” in Hume’s moral philosophy, with its insistence on the use of an “empiricist” terminology. This linguistic prevalence implies that for Hume moral feelings first depend on external relations and entities or on moral (epistemological) knowledge. Such a “stylistic insistence” on the word “experiencing” and its cognates induces the readers to have a particular understanding of Hume’s thought. They see Hume primarily as a traditional empiricist according to whom all knowledge, including moral knowledge, depends on cognitive and observational experiences. As an alternative interpretation, the article claims that in Hume’s intention knowledge is more direct, i.e. we “feel” moral approval rather that “experience” it. This means that the difference between “experience” and “feeling” is basic to capture the essence of Hume’s view. The word “experience” leads one to the word “empiricism”, which has never been used by him. Thus, morality is not something that emerges from observation or moral (epistemological) knowledge. Rather, it is something that is felt in a “particular”, “peculiar” way, of a “particular kind” of immediate pain and pleasure (see T 3.1.2.3:510-511 and EHU 8.2.35:145). Consequently, faithfulness to the original text is essential. Hume’s investigation on the “general foundation of morals” (see EPM 1.3:226) corroborates the insight that according his moral philosophy we “feel” moral good and evil rather than “experience” them. He writes that being esteemable or odious is peculiar to virtue and hatred in “their nature or essence” (see EPM 1.6:228).