Hume and the experimental justification of causal maxims

Abstract

In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume examined the status of the widely accepted principle that every event has a cause, and, after deciding that its truth is neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain, set out to investigate whether it could be established by experience. That investigation was inconclusive because Hume soon replaced the original problem by another one, concerning the experimental validation of another principle, viz. that similar causes have similar effects, although even in this case a rational justification for its acceptance was not obtained. Since Hume does not question the validity and use of these principles, would it be correct to conclude, as Lewis White Beck does, that they have the status of a priori principles in Hume’s system? In this paper I offer a critical examination of some arguments that might provide some experimental justification of these principles, in accordance with Hume’s system.