David Chalmers' Error: Why is property dualism wrong?

Why is property dualism wrong?

Abstract

This article aims to present David Chalmers’ theory of property dualism and to identify a set of conceptual problems that, in our view, undermine this philosophy of consciousness. We begin by outlining the core aspects of Chalmers’ proposal, focusing on his three central principles: structural coherence, organizational invariance, and the dual aspect of information. Subsequently, we analyze and discuss three major objections to property dualism: (1) the problem of non-physicality, which questions whether non-physical properties can exist and interact in a universe governed entirely by physical laws;(2) the problem of the philosophical zombie, which we argue is conceptually naive, logically inconsistent, and empirically implausible, as it underestimates the functional role of phenomenological consciousness in learning, perception, and decision-making; and(3) the problem of Mary’s room, which we interpret not as an ontological challenge to physicalism, but as an epistemological limitation in accessing first-person experience through third-person descriptions.