Contingency, correlationism, and reality:

criticism by Slavoj Žižek and Markus Gabriel of Meillassoux’s project

Abstract

This paper closely examines the philosophical ideas of contingency, correlationism, and reality, focusing on the criticisms formulated by Slavoj Žižek and Markus Gabriel of Quentin Meillassoux's project. Žižek highlights a critique of the absolutization of contingency in Meillassoux, arguing that the philosopher fails to truly overcome Kantian correlationism. Žižek, in contrast, defends transcendental correlation as an integral part of the thing-in-itself, emphasizing the importance of understanding the relationship between how things are in themselves and how they appear to a subject. On the other hand, Markus Gabriel contributes by emphasizing modes of presentation in the constitution of reality. He explores the idea that the difference between how things are in themselves and how they are presented is constitutive of reality. Gabriel delves into the diversity of ways in which reality manifests, highlighting the complexity of the relationship between subject and object. The text also addresses Žižek's critique of Meillassoux's project of seeking the thing-in-itself 'out there,' arguing that contingency is not merely an external aspect to subjectivity but also inherent to the subject itself as a cut in the circuit of natural causality. Throughout the paper, the divergences and contributions of these philosophers are highlighted, providing an in-depth analysis of the relations between contingency, correlation, and the fundamental nature of reality. The intersection of these criticisms offers a comprehensive perspective on the challenges and implications of Meillassoux's approach in the contemporary philosophical landscape.