The meaning of moral termsReconciling the naturalistic realisms of Cornell and Camberra through the meaning of moral terms

Abstract

This paper analyzes the distinction between the explanation of the meaning of moral terms in two frequently contrasted realist postures: the analytic naturalistic realism, especially as developed by the Canberra plan, and synthetic naturalist realism, in which Cornell realists are the main exponents. Characteristically, Cornell realists hold that terms for moral kinds relate to the instantiation of natural kinds that can be empirically mapped; while the Canberra plan advocates that the meaning of moral terms needs to be analytically established. However, the distinction between analytical and synthetic realism may be unconvincing since the synthetic identities of Cornell's realism cannot abdicate conceptual analyzes that delimit the proper scope of moral terms. On the other hand, while admitting a priori investigations into the term morals, the Canberra plan also does not reject the synthetic identities between moral terms and natural types, making the two positions much more similar regarding the meaning of moral terms than their respective epithets suggest.