Kierkegaard and The Function of Boredom in Existence

Abstract

Kierkegaard refers to the notion of boredom (Kjedsomhed) in three different moments of his work. Firstly, as a negative unity (“The Concept of Irony”). Secondly, as a principle of motion (“Either/Or”, part one). Finally, as the demonic (“The Concept of Anxiety”). Although boredom is a marginal notion in Kierkegaard’s thought, it does not mean that it is philosophically irrelevant. The purpose of this paper is to show that boredom plays a discreet but fundamental role in the actualization of the Self (Selv). I argue that boredom may be understood as a disposition which aims to engage individuals with actuality (Virkelighed). While the aesthetic does not deal appropriately with boredom—trying to prevent it through pleasure, imagination, or reflection—, the ethical-religious faces it with the earnestness (Alvor) demanded by existence.