Hegel e a apercepção pura transcendental de Kant

Abstract

In this article I address the issue of Hegel's interpretation of the concept of pure transcendental apperception in Kant. For that, I debate with the position of Robert Pippin, who affirms that Hegel takes the kantian transcendental point of view, according to which self-awareness bases the knowledge of objects. In my view, Hegel initially makes a positive analysis of the kantian argument about apperception, agreeing with Kant about the unity and the thinking and self-referential character of the self. However, Hegel strongly criticizes Kant for considering self-awareness only from a subjective point of view, in an external relationship with the object. In this sense, I will try to show some points that I consider wrong in Pippin's reading of the hegelian interpretation of the kantian concept of pure apperception. Furthermore, I think that Hegel incorporates into his Logic what he conceives as a speculative element within the kantian argument about pure transcendental apperception, thus transforming Kant's understanding of the I think into his logical-speculative conception of the concept.