Does moral responsibility require mental time travel? Considerations about guidance control

Authors

  • Beatriz Sorrentino Marques Universidade Federal de Mato Grosso, Departament of Philosophy, ICHS.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2018.191.10

Abstract

The debate about moral responsibility for one’s actions often revolves around whether the agent had the ability to do otherwise. An alternative account of moral responsibility, however, focuses on the actual sequence that produces the agent’s action and which criteria it must fulfil for the agent to be considered morally responsible for her action. Mental Time Travel allows the agent to simulate a possible future scenario; therefore, it is relevant for the selection of a course of action. I will argue that implicit prospection is a rudimentary form of Mental Time Travel and that the role that implicit prospection, or non-rudimentary forms of Mental Time Travel, plays in the production of intentional actions helps explain guidance control and, hence, moral responsibility.

Keywords: implicit prospection, guidance control, feeling the future, plan, intention.

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Author Biography

Beatriz Sorrentino Marques, Universidade Federal de Mato Grosso, Departament of Philosophy, ICHS.

Professor at Universidade Federal de Mato Grosso, Departament of Philosophy.

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Published

2018-08-16

How to Cite

SORRENTINO MARQUES, B. Does moral responsibility require mental time travel? Considerations about guidance control. Filosofia Unisinos / Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, São Leopoldo, v. 19, n. 1, p. 89–96, 2018. DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2018.191.10. Disponível em: https://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2018.191.10. Acesso em: 12 may. 2025.

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