Issues for Lowe’s dualist view on agents

Authors

  • Beatriz Sorrentino Marques Universidade Federal do Mato Grosso, UFMT

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2016.173.13

Abstract

E.J. Lowe (2008) proposes a dualist conception of agents. He grounds his dualist view on the Unity Argument, which I claim relies on unwarranted presuppositions about the agent and, therefore, cannot support his view. This is a problem for Lowe’s account of actions as well, because his account relies on his dualist view of agents.

Keywords: Agents, dualism, mental states.

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Author Biography

Beatriz Sorrentino Marques, Universidade Federal do Mato Grosso, UFMT

Professora do Departamento de Filosofia, ICHS, Universidade Federal do Mato Grosso, UFMT, Campus Cuiabá

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Published

2016-12-30

How to Cite

SORRENTINO MARQUES, B. Issues for Lowe’s dualist view on agents. Filosofia Unisinos / Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, São Leopoldo, v. 17, n. 3, p. 340–345, 2016. DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2016.173.13. Disponível em: https://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2016.173.13. Acesso em: 11 may. 2025.

Issue

Vol. 17 No. 3 (2016): September/December

Section

Philosophy South

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