Necessary truths, evidence, and knowledge

Authors

  • Art?rs Logins University of Geneva

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2016.173.06

Abstract

According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more general conclusions concerning theorizing about evidence.

Keywords: functions of evidence, E=K, evidential probability, probability raising.

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Published

2016-12-30

How to Cite

LOGINS, A. Necessary truths, evidence, and knowledge. Filosofia Unisinos / Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, São Leopoldo, v. 17, n. 3, p. 302–307, 2016. DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2016.173.06. Disponível em: https://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2016.173.06. Acesso em: 11 may. 2025.

Issue

Vol. 17 No. 3 (2016): September/December

Section

Philosophy South

License

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