Delusion as a folk psychological kind

Authors

  • Jose Eduardo Porcher UFPR - PNPD Capes

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2016.172.16

Abstract

In this paper I discuss the scientific respectability of delusion as a psychiatric category. First, I present the essentialist objection to the natural kindhood of psychiatric categories, as well as non-essentialism about natural kinds as a response to that objection. Second, I present a nuanced classification of kinds of kinds. Third, drawing on the claim that the attribution of delusion relies on a folk psychological underpinning, I present the mind-dependence objection to the natural kind status of delusion. Finally, I argue that even if delusion as a generic kind stands little chance of being vindicated as a non-essentialist natural kind, we stand to gain from a natural kind methodology regarding subtypes of delusion for which there is evidence of genuine causal signatures and mechanisms.

Keywords: delusion, folk psychiatry, psychiatry.

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Published

2016-10-04

How to Cite

PORCHER, J. E. Delusion as a folk psychological kind. Filosofia Unisinos / Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, São Leopoldo, v. 17, n. 2, p. 212–226, 2016. DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2016.172.16. Disponível em: https://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2016.172.16. Acesso em: 9 may. 2025.

Issue

Vol. 17 No. 2 (2016): May/August

Section

Dossier

License

I grant the Filosofia Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy the first publication of my article, licensed under Creative Commons Attribution license 4.0 (which allows sharing of work, recognition of authorship and initial publication in this journal).

I confirm that my article is not being submitted to another publication and has not been published in its entirely on another journal. I take full responsibility for its originality and I will also claim responsibility for charges from claims by third parties concerning the authorship of the article.