Realism, irrealism and truth

Authors

  • Nélida Gentile Universidad de Buenos Aires – UBA

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2016.172.10

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analize whether Goodman’s pluralism leaves room for a correspondentist version of truth, in spite of his explicit rejection of this. I will argue that Goodman associates the notion of correspondence exclusively with the perspective of traditional metaphysical realism that he refuses; but pace Goodman, it is perfectly possible to reconcile his pluralism with a correspondence theory of truth. I think that unless pluralism and the correspondence theory of truth can be combined, Goodman’s position is unsustainable due to restrictions he imposes to pluralism.

Keywords: Nelson Goodman, irrealism, correspondence theory of truth.

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Published

2016-10-05

How to Cite

GENTILE, N. Realism, irrealism and truth. Filosofia Unisinos / Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, São Leopoldo, v. 17, n. 2, p. 155–160, 2016. DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2016.172.10. Disponível em: https://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2016.172.10. Acesso em: 11 may. 2025.

Issue

Vol. 17 No. 2 (2016): May/August

Section

Philosophy South

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