Realism about What? Unobservable Entities and the Metaphysics of Modality

Authors

  • Bruno Borge Universidad de Buenos Aires

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2016.171.09

Abstract

Most philosophers who advocate Scientific Realism (SR) endorse also Modal Realism (MR), i.e., assume commitments with objective modality. However, the precise relationship between these positions has been scarcely explored. In this paper I argue that there is an indirect implication from SR to MR. Although the basic thesis of SR does not imply MR, both the main argument for SR and the best realist theory of reference do imply modal commitments.

Keywords: Scientific Realism, Modal Realism, Modality, No-Miracle Argument, Causal Descriptivism.

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Published

2016-07-06

How to Cite

BORGE, B. Realism about What? Unobservable Entities and the Metaphysics of Modality. Filosofia Unisinos / Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, São Leopoldo, v. 17, n. 1, p. 69–74, 2016. DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2016.171.09. Disponível em: https://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2016.171.09. Acesso em: 9 may. 2025.

Issue

Vol. 17 No. 1 (2016): January/April

Section

Philosophy South

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