Attention and the limits of conscious experience

Authors

  • Francisco Pereira Departamento de Filosofía Universidad Alberto Hurtado Chile

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2015.162.04

Abstract

The phenomenological conception of common sense inspired by James (1890) claims that attending is essentially a conscious mental phenomenon. The modal philosophical implications of this thesis regarding the nature of attention are clear. It is not possible to attend something without being conscious of that thing. On the basis of classical studies on visual pathologies such as blindsight and recent experiments with non-pathological subjects, this paper argues that the Jamesian philosophical conclusion regarding the metaphysics of attention is false. Evidence suggests that in fact it is possible to attend to objects without consciously experiencing them.

Keywords: attention, consciousness, blindsight, common sense, phenomenology.

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Author Biography

Francisco Pereira, Departamento de Filosofía Universidad Alberto Hurtado Chile

Profesor Adjunto, Departamento de Filosofía

M.A. in Philosophy, King´s College London

Ph.D. in Philosophy, King´s College London

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Published

2015-10-09

How to Cite

PEREIRA, F. Attention and the limits of conscious experience. Filosofia Unisinos / Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, São Leopoldo, v. 16, n. 2, p. 145–163, 2015. DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2015.162.04. Disponível em: https://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2015.162.04. Acesso em: 6 jul. 2025.

Issue

Vol. 16 No. 2 (2015): May/August

Section

Articles

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