The rational reconstruction of the research program on classic rationalism: Locke and the empiricist approach

Abstract

This article intends to rationally reconstruct Locke’s theory of knowledge as incorporated in a research program concerning the nature and structure of the theories and models of rationality. In previous articles we argued that the rationalist program can be subdivided into the classical rationalistic subprogram, which includes the knowledge theories of Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant, the neoclassical subprogram, which includes the approaches of Duhem, Poincaré and Mach, and the critical subprogram of Popper. The subdivision results from the different views of rationality proposed by each one of these subprograms, as well as from the tools made available by each one of them, containing theoretical instruments used to arrange, organize and develop the discussion on rationality, the main one of which is the structure of solution of problems. In this essay we intend to reconstruct the assumptions of Locke’s theory of knowledge, which in our view belongs to the classical rationalistic subprogram because it shares with it the thesis of the identity of (scientific) knowledge and certain knowledge.

Key words: rationalism, empiricism, theory of knowledge, certainty and truth, problem solving approach.