John Searle and the ontology of the social world: Groundwork for a theory on the object of legal science
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4013/4643Abstract
Searle’s theory on the ontology of the social world affords reasons to explain the existence of such things as “laws” and “rights” without the assumption that there are any “natural” rights. In this article, I intend to point out some consequences Searle’s theory has in the field of philosophy of law. As I intend to show, it is possible to describe Searle’s theory as a version of legal positivism.
Key words: Searle, law, legal positivism, social ontology, human rights.Downloads
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