Absolute power and moral knowledge

Abstract

In this study, we attempt to obtain a better understanding of the ethical theory of the Franciscan philosopher John Duns Scotus, especially of the so-called “voluntaristic” character of his theory and at the same time of its rational accessibility. In this sense, through a detailed analysis of the distinction between absolute power (potentia absoluta) and ordinate power (potentia ordinata), we wish to clarify what is, for Scotus, the legal or prescriptive character of rules of action and what is the ultimate foundation of moral propositions. For this purpose, the study, which methodologically gives priority to the investigation of the topic departing from Reportatio examinata I d. 44 q. 1, offers initially a discussion of the explicit meaning of potentia absoluta and of potentia ordinata. It then emphasizes the relationship between those two powers and the nature of moral truths and also on two distinctions – referring to precepts of law – that explain how the revocation and the modification of a law or of an established order of laws have a place in the perspective of an absolute legislator.

Key words: John Duns Scotus, absolute power, ordinate power, moral principles, moral knowledge, ethics of divine command, natural law.