Existential feelings and the feeling of pastness in episodic remembering

Abstract

In this paper, I propose a collaborative approach to analysing the phenomenal experience of episodic remembering, bringing together contemporary phenomenology of existential feelings with metacognitive approaches to the feeling of pastness. I explore the issue of how existential feelings, through their pre-intentional function, can constitute the intentionality and valence of the epistemic feelings involved in episodic remembering. I present (1) the main results of the phenomenological analysis of existential feelings, and (2) the outcomes from the metacognitive-affectivalist account on the feeling of pastness in episodic remembering. Then, I consider (3) the dependence relation between experiences of possibilities provided by existential feelings and the role of context in specifying the pastness content of the epistemic feeling involved in episodic remembering. Finally, I sketch (4) an analysis of the horizon intentionality proper to the feeling of pastness. I conclude presenting directions for future research into a phenomenology of episodic memory based on the elucidation of existential feelings.