On On the normative impact of demanding

a hohfeldian interpretation

Abstract

In our everyday assertions about rights, we often speak of demands as things people have, and of demanding as something they do. This article offers a new Hohfeldian interpretation of the normative impact of demanding. Section I clarifies the notions of demand and demanding as employed here. Section II presents the Hohfeldian framework underlying the analysis, explains my choice of interpretive approach, and highlights a key point of divergence from three dominant variants - namely, my decision to keep the Hohfeldian distinction between powers and claims. Sections III and IV examine Carl Wellman’s and Margaret Gilbert’s theories. Although I agree with both authors that demanding creates a new reason for the duty-bearer to comply, I challenge their accounts of the normative impact of that reason. In Section V, I propose an alternative theory: demanding functions as a prima facie trigger for the reconsideration of prior non-compliance and supplies a new reason for compliance that may - depending on context - alter the balance of reasons in favor of fulfilling the duty. Section VI concludes with a summary of the argument.