Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological reduction

A reading of the introductory chapters of the “phenomenology of perception”

Abstract

In this article I oppose the idea that in the “Phenomenology of Perception”, Merleau-Ponty rejects any form of ‘phenomenological reduction’. Not only does he not reject the ‘phenomenological reduction’: the introductory chapters of the work are also meant to carry it out. The starting-point of Merleau-Ponty’s ‘phenomenological reduction’ lies, therefore, in the critique of the notion of ‘sensation’. However, his reduction differs from the Husserlian one. Whereas for Husserl performing the reduction means suspending adherence to the belief in the existence of the world, for Merleau-Ponty the reduction consists in the return to the ‘lived world’, to the ‘immediate’ or, as he also says, to the ‘phenomenal field’. The latter cannot in turn, be traced back to its constitution in the domain of pure or transcendental consciousness. I conclude with the idea that the difference between Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s conception and execution of the ‘phenomenological reduction’ lies in their different understanding of subjectivity. As opposed to Husserl’s transcendental subject, Merleau-Ponty’s body-subject is essentially opaque to itself and therefore it is not possible to account, in a fully transparent manner, for the way it opens itself to the world.