The problem of monism in contemporary interpretations of Hegelian metaphysics

Abstract

The aim of this article is to examine the question of whether Hegel’s Logic is the grounding of a metaphysical monism. The argument will be divided into three sections: (i) the origin and the context of the ongoing use of the notion of monism as interpretive category of Hegel’s philosophy; (ii) the discussion of a series of claims in favour or against monism in the contemporary debate over Hegelian metaphysics; (iii) the critique of ontological pluralism. The thesis that follows from the critical analysis of the debate is that Hegel’s metaphysics is a peculiar kind of idealism that neutralizes any dichotomy between monism and pluralism, as it tries to grasp comprehensively both the unity of the idea and the plurality of its ways of manifestation (logical natural, spiritual).