Motives and moral theory in Hume

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2025.262.02

Keywords:

motives, moral theory, moral sentimentalism, sympathy, Hume.

Abstract

Hume’s moral sentimentalism is based on the practicality of morals. Because the object of moral distincions is presented in actions, the will and its motives are crucial for the nature of these distinctions. After explaining what gives moral dimension to an action, I analyse the principle “which takes us so far out of ourselves” so that the morality of actions is brought about. But it’s only its operation from a “judicious spectator” point of view, that makes possible a “stable” judgment of things by making it turn on the influence and effect of actions on the persons affected by them, that we can form the moral terms which we use in tracing moral distinctions. I argue that this is a basis sufficient for morality to present us with the motives for actions towards the people involved in this situation of moral appreciation. And the reason for that is the sentimental expansion constitutive of morals which is an expansion of our common humanity to which we are not indifferent. In this way, Hume’s moral theory gives a backing to the morality of actions. The conclusion is that Hume’s “undoubted maxim” is incontroversial: we need to supose “a motive to the action distinct from the sense of duty”. It is the “antecedent principle of humanity, which is meritorious and laudable”.

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Published

2025-07-14

How to Cite

KLAUDAT, A. Motives and moral theory in Hume. Filosofia Unisinos / Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, São Leopoldo, v. 26, n. 2, p. 1–15, 2025. DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2025.262.02. Disponível em: https://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/27458. Acesso em: 19 jul. 2025.

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