Hermeneutical praxis as an exercise of the virtue of practical wisdom

Abstract

By appropriating Aristotle’s phronesis and integrating it into the structure of philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer ultimately points to its ethical dimension. Being aware of the unending controversies about the concept of phronesis in Aristotle, in this article I propose to take it as practical wisdom, which is inherent in hermeneutical theory and practice. Its implementation institutes a virtue that enables the achievement of happiness, the establishment of meaning and the growth of our way of being and acting. For this purpose, I initially explore the notion of phronesis as the structural model of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Then I justify the praxis of hermeneutics as an exercise of the virtue of practical wisdom, as it is a deliberative circular exercise between means and ends. Like the phronimos, the hermeneut seeks to understand the real in order to foster an ethos designed to establish harmony, mutual responsibility and eudaimonia. As an illustration, I connect the text with the hermeneutic postures of Teiresias and Haimon, who criticize Creon for being unwise. They are exemplary representatives of the need to circularly ponder means and ends, to have discernment, to take it seriously that others may have good ideas for the institution of a more harmonious and happy ethos. At the end I present implications of this reflection and highlight the fact that it is a part in the foundation of ethical hermeneutics, which constitutes the focus of my research on the hermeneutical tradition.