The classical theory of concepts and the concept of god
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.222.09Abstract
While the failure of the so-called classical theory of concepts – according to which definitions are the proper way to characterize concepts – is a consensus, metaphysical philosophy of religion still deals with the concept of God in a predominantly definitional manner. We can then ask: Do this failure imply that a definitional characterization of the concept of God is equally untenable? My central purpose in this article is to answer that question. My emphasis is representational. I plan to analyze the extent to which the most important problems raised against the classical theory of concepts affect a definitional-representational approach to the concept of God. As a result of this effort, I show that the criticisms against the classical theory that threaten such an approach depend on the plurality characteristic of the interreligious context, which in its turn creates other problems.
Keywords: Classical theory of concepts, concept of God, plurality of the concept of God.
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