Quine and Searle on meaning

Authors

  • Heronides Moura UFSC
  • Giuseppe Freitas Varaschin Graduando em Letras- UFSC

Abstract

This article hopes, primarily, to present Quine’s objections to the mentalistic theory of meaning. Then, we attempt to show that Quine’s rejection is not grounded on good reasons, and that it leads to certain incoherencies. Lastly, we present some mentalistic alternatives, specially Searle´s theory, sustaining that meaning is a useful notion in semantics.

Key words: meaning, W.V. Quine, J. Searle, mentalism, cognition.

Author Biographies

Heronides Moura, UFSC

Doutor em Linguística UNICAMP 1996

Área: semântica cognitiva

Giuseppe Freitas Varaschin, Graduando em Letras- UFSC

Graduando em Letras- UFSC. Realiza TCC sob orientação de Heronides Moura

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Published

2013-12-13

How to Cite

Moura, H., & Varaschin, G. F. (2013). Quine and Searle on meaning. Calidoscópio, 11(3), 320–327. Retrieved from https://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/calidoscopio/article/view/cld.2013.113.10

Issue

Vol. 11 No. 3 (2013): September/December

Section

Articles

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