Decisão e argumentação em Alexy (limites aplicativos da teoria). Um freio à discricionariedade?

Authors

  • Jeferson Dytz Marin Universidade de Caxias do Sul
  • Camila Paese Fedrigo Universidade de Caxias do Sul

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/rechtd.2015.71.07

Abstract

The legal rules do not reach to the judge the discretion that had been seen in court. Most of the cases show that the application of the decision theories present in modernity justify the judgments according to their conscience. Rules and principles are standards, registering simple ontological distinction. Alexy’s theory seems to make the decision more sophisticated, raising legal antinomies above the first category of his decision theory, even when the simple application of the standard enables the solution to the case. It is the exact goal of the Alexyan theory that people want to reach.

Keywords: hermeneutics, judicial discretion, weighing, principles and rules, Robert Alexy.

Author Biography

Jeferson Dytz Marin, Universidade de Caxias do Sul

PROFESSOR DO MESTRADO EM DIREITO - UCS

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Published

2015-04-22

Issue

Vol. 7 No. 1 (2015): Janeiro/Abril

Section

Articles

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