Teoria da Indeterminação no Direito

Authors

  • Rafael Giorgio Dalla-Barba Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Kriminalität, Sicherheit und Recht (MPI-CSL, Alemanha)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/rechtd.2025.172.10

Author Biography

Rafael Giorgio Dalla-Barba, Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Kriminalität, Sicherheit und Recht (MPI-CSL, Alemanha)

Assessor de Ministro do STF. Doutorando em Direito pela Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg. Bolsista de doutorado a Stiftung der Deutschen Wirtschaft (SDW). Mestre em Direito Público e Bacharel em Direito pela Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos (Unisinos). Advogado (OAB/RS 102.395). A presente recensão foi elaborada na condição de assistente científico do Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Kriminalität, Sicherheit und Recht (MPI-CSL). Günterstalstraße 73, 79100, Freiburg im Breisgau, Alemanha.

References

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Published

2025-12-09

Issue

Vol. 17 No. 2 (2025): May/August

Section

Book review

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