Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment and Re-enactment: Rules, Choices and Consequences

Authors

  • Ousu Mendy Victoria University of Wellington

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/rechtd.2026.181.04

Abstract

In contemporary comparative constitutional studies, one of the most intriguing questions is: Is it possible to declare a constitutional amendment to be unconstitutional? If so, by whom and by what standards? This research delves into unconstitutional constitutional amendments and re-enactments, the choices, the rules, and the consequences that follow. A doctrinal research method is used through secondary legal data in both descriptive and prescriptive approaches. In this research, I take a holistic study of three constitutional changes – both successful and unsuccessful changes in The Gambia, Kenya and Israel – as fresh issues and use them to draw a conclusion. Formal constitutional amendment rules are the decisive mechanisms to constitutional precinct, but constitutional re-enactments tend to digress from their presuppositions and are not aligned with their basic structure, thereby destroying the continuity of the legal order. A constitution ought to be a speaking one that arises to the constant change of society because there has been a discernible change in the global constitutional debate away from the normative or institutionalist perspective and toward a more analytical and comparative approach when assessing the setting of constitutional making processes. Therefore, to change a significant provision of a constitution that has direct effect on the status of a state by taking the people away from the basket of progressive realization of a state is a non sequitur to constitutional amendment rules.

Author Biography

Ousu Mendy, Victoria University of Wellington

PhD Scholar on Comparative Contitutional Law.

Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington

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Published

2026-04-29