Seeing-as and hinge epistemology

Authors

  • Maria Sol Yuan Instituto de Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales (IHuCSo), del Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Tecnológicas (CONICET) y la Universidad Nacional del Litoral (UNL) https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5810-3940

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.221.04

Abstract

This paper aims to stablishes the sense in which propositions included under the perceptual use of ‘seeing-as’, developed by Wittgenstein in the Second Part of Philosophical Investigations, are justifiable from an epistemic point of view. To do this, first, it will be clarified the internal link between ‘visual experience’ and ‘interpretation’ for the type of mentioned cases. Second, it will be shown how the ‘seeing-as’ respects the rule-following paradox’s solution, as long as it does not presuppose any intermediary or need anyone to account for what is perceived, highlighting the notions of ‘practice’, ‘familiarity’ and ‘context’ common both in the aforementioned solution and in the ‘seeing-as’ cases. Third, the general distinction between certainties or ‘hinges’ and ‘epistemic propositions’ presented by Wittgenstein in On Certainty will be applied to cases of aspect perception as a possible field of application of the so called Hinge Epistemology, showing how, in specific cases, the perceptual certainties that shape our way of life and that are groundless, can be recontextualized and merit reasonable justification.

Keywords: Wittgenstein, aspect perception, seeing-as, hinges, certainty, justification.

Author Biography

Maria Sol Yuan, Instituto de Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales (IHuCSo), del Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Tecnológicas (CONICET) y la Universidad Nacional del Litoral (UNL)

Dra. en Filosofía (UBA)

Becaria Posdoctoral (CONICET)

JTP Teoría del Conocimiento, Departamento de Filosofía (FHUC-UNL).

Published

2021-03-15

Issue

Section

Articles