Against intuitions

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.221.03

Abstract

This paper intends to offer a critical evaluation of the role played by intuitions in the mainstream methodology in traditional analytic epistemology. The criticism directed to what I call methodology of evaluation by intuitions shows that epistemologists often idealize the reliability of intuitions when assessing a theory against potential counterexamples, ignoring that the disposition to answer intuitively to a case of concept attribution is bounded to the familiar dimension in which the relevant conceptual competence emerges. Thus, the reliability of intuitions does not necessarily extend to far-fetched cases. Given that the assessment by our intuitions is not sufficient to decide for or against an epistemological theory, I offer a sketch for a pragmatic and naturalized conception of theoretical decision-making in epistemology.

Key-words: Intuitions, Analytic epistemology, Conceptual abilities, Naturalism, Pragmatism.

Published

2021-03-15

Issue

Section

Articles