Realism, irrealism and truth

Nélida Gentile

Abstract


The purpose of this paper is to analize whether Goodman’s pluralism leaves room for a correspondentist version of truth, in spite of his explicit rejection of this. I will argue that Goodman associates the notion of correspondence exclusively with the perspective of traditional metaphysical realism that he refuses; but pace Goodman, it is perfectly possible to reconcile his pluralism with a correspondence theory of truth. I think that unless pluralism and the correspondence theory of truth can be combined, Goodman’s position is unsustainable due to restrictions he imposes to pluralism.

Keywords: Nelson Goodman, irrealism, correspondence theory of truth.


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