Belief and pluralistic ignorance




Pluralistic ignorance is usually analyzed in terms of social norms. Recently, Bjerring, Hansen and Pedersen (2014) describe and define this phenomenon in terms of beliefs, actions and evidence. Here I apply a basic epistemic approach to belief – believers consider their beliefs to be true –, a basic pragmatic approach to belief – beliefs are useful for believers – and a mixed epistemic-pragmatic approach – believers consider their believes to be true and such considerations are useful – to pluralistic ignorance phenomena. For that, I take the definition given by Bjerring et al. (2014).

Keywords: Truth, pragmatism, epistemic belief, pragmatic belief.

Author Biography

Marco Antonio Joven Romero, University of Santo Tomas (Manila, Philippines) Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (Madrid, Spain)

Professor, Department of Modern Languages, University of Santo Tomas

Researcher, Departamento de Lógica, Historia y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

Born in Zaragoza (Spain), I've been living in Spain, France, Venezuela and Philippines. I got the Spanish National Special Award for Academic Excellence in 2013, I defended my PhD Dissertation on the nature of belief in 2017 at Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED) and I've been working as a professor at the University of Santo Tomas (Manila, Philippines) since 2017. My main areas of expertise are Analytic Epistemology, Linguistics and Cultural Diversity.