Belief and pluralistic ignorance

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2020.213.03

Abstract

Pluralistic ignorance is usually analyzed in terms of social norms. Recently, Bjerring, Hansen and Pedersen (2014) describe and define this phenomenon in terms of beliefs, actions and evidence. Here I apply a basic epistemic approach to belief – believers consider their beliefs to be true –, a basic pragmatic approach to belief – beliefs are useful for believers – and a mixed epistemic-pragmatic approach – believers consider their believes to be true and such considerations are useful – to pluralistic ignorance phenomena. For that, I take the definition given by Bjerring et al. (2014).

Keywords: Truth, pragmatism, epistemic belief, pragmatic belief.

Metrics

Metrics Loading ...

Author Biography

Marco Antonio Joven Romero, University of Santo Tomas (Manila, Philippines) Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (Madrid, Spain)

Professor, Department of Modern Languages, University of Santo Tomas

Researcher, Departamento de Lógica, Historia y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

Born in Zaragoza (Spain), I've been living in Spain, France, Venezuela and Philippines. I got the Spanish National Special Award for Academic Excellence in 2013, I defended my PhD Dissertation on the nature of belief in 2017 at Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED) and I've been working as a professor at the University of Santo Tomas (Manila, Philippines) since 2017. My main areas of expertise are Analytic Epistemology, Linguistics and Cultural Diversity.

Downloads

Published

2020-11-25

Issue

Section

Articles