Counting, Cardinality, and Equinumerosity: reasons to a reconsideration of Husserl’s critique to Frege in "Philosophy of Arithmetic"
Husserl states in his first book, Philosophy of Arithmetic, that we do not find an adequate logical analysis of the concept of number in terms of equinumerosity, in G. Frege. According to Husserl, Frege’s characterization of number as a close connection between our concept of cardinal number and the notion of one-one correspondence is erroneous. The aim of this article is to show that Husserl’s reading of Frege in Philosophy of Arithmetic, specifically in Freges Versuch, contains a series of mistakes and misunderstandings.
Keywords: Husserl, Frege, psychologism, Philosophy of Arithmetic, equinumerosity, phenomenology, one-one correspondence.
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