

On truth as the source of good: An is/ought reinterpretation

Sobre a verdade como fonte do bem: uma reinterpretação do *ser ao dever ser*

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ABSTRACT: Chinese and western philosophies tend to give different answers to *is/ought* relation. The disputes provide a broader vision to make a re-exploration into the old and fruitful question. Clear distinctions between the subjective fact judgment and the objective fact, between the subjective value judgment and the objective value are the prerequisite. A subjective fact judgment, an *is* statement, consists of two elements: the judging person or power, and the judged object, i.e. the objective fact. It is the judged object itself that works as the criterion for the true or false of the fact judgment. A subjective value judgment, or an *ought* statement, consists of three elements: the judging person or power, the judged object or the objective fact, and the third element, which is something other than the judged object and works as the criterion for the making of the good or evil judgment. The third element in the value judgment is the core in the *is/ought* distinction and also the source of *ought*. Further analyses into the third elements under different types of value judgments show that this source of *ought* is fundamentally and essentially factual. The relation of fitness objectively existing between the judged object and the third element is found to be the ultimate factual foundation of value judgment. A final reunification of *is* and *ought* is achieved at the factual relation of fitness while the difference between *is/ought* lies only in the perspectives to depict the relation. So, fundamentally, *ought* can only be derived from *is* while the good flows from the truth. Such a conclusion accepts the Chinese connection thesis between *is* and *ought*, but rejects its emphasis of good over truth.

Key words: *Is/ought*, two-element judgment/three-element judgment, the third element, truth/good.

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RESUMO: É tendência das filosofias chinesas e ocidentais darem respostas diferentes à relação ser/dever ser. Essas disputas fornecem uma visão mais ampla para que seja possível reexplorar a velha questão de maneira mais frutífera. Distinções claras entre o juízo da realidade subjetiva e objetiva do fato, entre o juízo do valor subjetivo e valor objetivo são os pré-requisitos. Um juízo subjetivo do fato, uma declaração afirmativa, é constituído por dois elementos: a pessoa ou poder de julgar, e o objeto julgado, ou seja, o fato objetivo. O objeto em si funciona como o critério de verdadeiro ou falso para o julgamento do fato. Um juízo de valor subjetivo, uma declaração imperativa, consiste em três elementos: a pessoa ou o poder de julgamento, o objeto julgado ou o fato objetivo, e o terceiro elemento, que é algo diferente do objeto julgado e funciona como critério para a tomada de juízos bons ou maus. O terceiro elemento do juízo de valor é a essência da distinção *is/ought* (é/deve) e também a fonte do que convém. Outras análises sob diferentes tipos de juízos de valor mostram que essa fonte deveria ser fundamentalmente e essencialmente factual. A relação de adequação objetiva existente entre o objeto julgado e o terceiro elemento é considerada como o último fundamento factual de juízo de valor. A reunificação final é e deve ser feita em relação factual de aptidão enquanto a diferença entre elas é/deve ser reside apenas nas perspectivas para descrever a relação. Então, fundamentalmente, *ought* só pode ser derivado de *is* enquanto o bem flui da verdade. Tal conclusão apoia a tese do conexionismo chinês entre *is* e *ought*, que objetifica a verdade sobre o bem.

Palavras-chave: ser/dever, juízo de dois elementos/juízo de três elementos, o terceiro elemento, verdade/bem.

***Is/ought* conflict as a cultural conflict**

The world today is a world of cultural conflicts. Cultural conflicts appear in many forms. They can be different morals, conflicting religions, and even disputing philosophical conceptions. For example, an old philosophical question known to western philosophers as fact/value dichotomy has had quite different forms and different answers in China. In the West, David Hume makes the distinction between *is* and *ought*. According to Hume (1978), *ought*, the value judgment about virtue or vice, is substantially different from *is*, the fact judgment about true or false. *Ought* cannot be derived from *is*, as *ought* is not something rationally conceivable like *is*. Since Hume (1978) there have been probably three core points in Western philosophical tradition concerning the fact/value problem: (i) distinction: *ought* and *is* are essentially different; (ii) disconnection: *ought* cannot be derived from *is*; (iii) rationality controversy: whether or not *ought* can be rationally conceived.

The first point maintaining that fact and value are different has rarely been challenged.² The second point about the disconnection has not been much doubted either within the western tradition. Finnis (1980, p. 33-34), though disagreeing with Hume (1978) about whether values are rationally conceivable, holds the say idea in terms of the disconnection between *ought* and *is*: “(*Oughts*) are *per se nota* (self-evident) and indemonstrable. They are not inferred from speculative principles. They are not inferred from facts. They are not inferred from metaphysical propositions

² Though some later philosophers in the west do think it not appropriate to absolutized the dichotomy between fact and value but still maintain the distinction between the two. Hilary Putnam, from the United States, for example, claims the collapse of fact/value dichotomy. However, Putnam (2006, p. 10-11) makes clear distinction between the two terms of “dichotomy” and “distinction”, by which he rejects the “absolute dichotomy” as useless and a failure but takes “distinction” as the proper description of the relation between fact and value.

about human nature, or about the nature of good and evil, or about 'the function of a human being', nor are they inferred from a teleological conception of nature or any other conception of nature. They are not inferred or derived from anything". Disconnection thesis may be taken as the characteristic mainstream idea of western philosophy concerning fact/value relation.

But the third point concerning the rational inconceivability of value judgment has always been a center of controversies. Immanuel Kant, though played an important role in the evolution of the idea of the fact and value dichotomy, was thought to disagree with Hume in that Kant holds that moral propositions can be rationally defended and the whole Kantian moral philosophy could be taken as an explanation about why so. John Finnis as well claims that when discerning what is good, intelligence is operating in a different way, yielding a different logic, from when it is discerning what is the case (historically, scientifically, or metaphysically); but there is no good reason for asserting that the latter operations of intelligence are more rational than the former.

Without the clear-cut conceptualization in the west, fact/value problem has been discussed in quite different forms in classical Chinese philosophy and has involved some quite different conclusions. However, there is an agreement between Chinese and western philosophies on the basic distinction between fact and value. The traditional 知 (knowing) and 行 (doing) distinction is an example, which, though not equivalent to fact/value dichotomy, has covered in some degree the substance of it. The distinctions made between 为学 (knowledge) and 为道 (Tao) by Lao-tzu³, 见闻之知 (knowledge of the seen and heard) and 德性所知 (knowledge of virtue) by Zhang Zai⁴, 所以然 (what makes things what they are) and 所当然 (how things should be) by Chu Hsi⁵, etc. have also covered one way or the other the current fact/value dichotomy. According to Graham's interpretation, Chu Hsi's SUO YI RAN (what makes things what they are) refers to the matters of fact while SUO DANG RAN (how things should be) the values. These might be an example that the absence of a fact/value or *is/ought* dichotomies does not reflect a lacuna in Chinese thought and that the substantial question has been explored but in different terms or forms from the west (Graham, 2007, p. 277).

Since Chinese philosophy also recognizes the distinctions between the two, the inter-relation is therefore discussed. But striking differences arise here. While disconnection is the mainstream conception in the west, Chinese philosophy tends to hold the connection thesis that fact and value, instead of disconnected, are internally connected with each other. Chinese philosophy is characterized with its ideas on the internal connections between dichotomies⁶. The basic notion of 天人合一 (the oneness of the nature and the human) lays down the fundamental principle to connect human affairs with the physical. Zhang Dainian (1982, p. 7) takes 一天人 (the oneness of the nature and the human), 合知行 (the unity of knowing and

³ As interpreted by Fung Yulan, 为学 (WEI XUE) and 为道 (WEI DAO) are distinguished in the Chinese philosophical tradition that WEI XUE is to pursue knowledge while WEI DAO is to pursue virtues or moral values (Fung Yulan, 2001, p. 4-5).

⁴ According to Zhang Dainian (1982), the seen-heard knowledge is about physical things, and not the knowledge of virtue while the knowledge of virtue is not developed from the seen-heard knowledge (见闻之知乃物交而知, 非德性所知, 德性所知, 不萌于见闻。《正蒙·大心》)。

⁵ According to Chu Hsi (1989), each of the things in the world must have its reason that makes it what it is and its rule of how it should be ("至于天下之物, 则必各有所以然之故, 与其所当然之则, 所谓理也。《大学或问》卷一)。With the former knowledge, people will not be ignorant while with the latter, people will not act wrongly. (知其所以然, 故志不惑。知其所当然, 故行不谬。《晦庵先生朱文公文集》卷六十四《答或人七》)。

⁶ Like those of 上下 (the up and the down), 内外 (the in and the out), 人我 (the self and the other), 幽明 (the dark and the light) etc. (Zeng Chunhai, 2009, p. 28).

doing), 同真善 (truth-good integration) as the fundamental character of classic Chinese philosophy which demonstrate an opposite doctrine from the western in terms of fact/value relation.

This is not yet the end of the Chinese-Western dispute on fact/value problem. In contrast with the western controversy on whether *oughts* can be rationally conceived, Chinese philosophy, with its connection thesis, has come into an argument about the relative importance of the connected fact and value, which weighs more. Traditionally Chinese people tend to take the value judgments as the more significant part. Some philosophers like Xunzi⁷, Wang Yangming⁸ etc. emphasize the priority of action to knowledge, which in some degree implies priority of value to fact. Some more recent philosophers like Liang Shuming (2005), Fung Yulan (2001), Mou Zongsan (1997), and other Neo-Confucianists claim that Chinese culture is good-oriented in contrast with the truth-oriented western one, showing the emphasis of value over fact in Chinese culture.

There is also opinion in Chinese philosophy to put fact over value. In *The Great Learning* (《大学》), for example, all the value judgments like 诚意 (sincering the thoughts), 正心 (rectifying the heart), 修身 (cultivating the person), 齐家 (regulating the family), 治国 (governing the state), 平天下 (harmonizing the world) are internally connected with 格物 (investigating or approaching things) and thereafter 致知 (complete or arriving at knowledge). 格物 and 致知 as interpreted by Chu Hsi mean arriving at knowledge by approaching things⁹. Wang Yangming, following Chu's teaching, tried to arrive to the ultimate virtues by approaching bamboos (格竹). When western-originated modern physics first came to China, it was named as 格致. Thus, according to this understanding, value is not only connected with fact, but even takes fact as its foundation¹⁰.

In terms of fact/value problem, we have now found two significant differences between Chinese and western philosophies: connection versus disconnection, good-oriented versus truth-oriented. Modern neo-Confucianism gives an expanded interpretation of this philosophical problem from a broader cultural perspective, saying that Chinese culture is a good-oriented one while the western truth-oriented. Such a conception is fairly popular in today's China. Some Chinese people feel sad about it. They think the emphasis on the value part has led to the neglect of the fact part. This is why China, as a cultural deficiency, has not developed a tradition of science (Mou Zongsan, 1936). Though western people cannot get an agreement on the rationality of value judgments, they seldom doubt the rationality of fact judgment but highly value the rational fact judgment and hammer at them. This is thought to be the precious cultural superiority that has fostered the modern science, which Chinese people envy so much.

Some others do not feel so pessimistic. They take the good-oriented feature of Chinese culture as superiority rather than inferiority, thinking this might mean

⁷ According to Xunzi (XUNZI • QUANXUE), "One cannot know the height of the sky unless he is on a mountain, one cannot know the depth of the earth unless he is by a river" (不登高山, 不知天之高也; 不临深溪, 不知地之厚也。《荀子 • 劝学》). Therefore, knowing comes from doing.

⁸ According to Wang Yangming (CHUANXILU), "As for all the learnings in the world, none can be said to be a learning without doing" (尽天下之学, 无有不行而可以言学者。《传习录 • 卷中》).

⁹ There are controversies about the meanings of 格物 and 致知 in Chu Hsi's interpretation whether things refer to physical world or social behavior and whether knowledge refers to that of fact or that of ultimate values (Zhang Taiyan, 1995, "诸子略说").

¹⁰ Graham (2007, p. 277) was sort of puzzled with Chu Hsi's "所以然"与"所当然". As he takes the former as the matter of fact and the latter the imperative, Graham thinks they are totally two different kinds of problems, which cannot be confused and united, and it is wrong derive imperative from the premise of pure fact. However, neo-Confucianism does indeed combined the two together and therefore causes a severe problem in the eyes of the westerner.

that traditional Chinese morals have inherently greater good and could point out the possible way for mankind out of the world-wide spiritual crisis (Cheng Chung Ying, 1998, p. 283-284). Another conclusion that flows from this good/truth-orientation is the incomparability of Chinese and western cultures. Often when confronted with political or moral conflicts with the west, some Chinese would claim that there is no good or bad between us because we are essentially different cultures (Fang Zhaohui, 2002, p. 151-200).

This philosophical problem reflects in itself a cultural conflict. However, this problem may also be helpful with the solution to cultural conflicts in general. The most important part of cultural conflicts is value conflicts, and value or the root of value is the core of the fact/value dichotomy. If we could achieve better understanding of how a value comes, there should be a better chance for us to settle the most severe part of cultural conflicts. So, further exploration into fact/value dichotomy is valuable. And this exploration could be more fruitful as we are no longer seeing the problem from Chinese or western point of view alone. We have both, a broader vision.

***Is/ought* reinterpreted: Two-element/three-element judgments**

At the start of the exploration, it is important to make clear the distinction between the subjective fact judgment and the objective fact, between the subjective value judgment and its objective reference. The objective fact is the autonomous existence out there for people to perceive while the subjective fact judgment is the content of such perception. The objective reference of a value judgment is the autonomous existence out there for people to perceive while the subjective value judgment is the content of such perception. A subjective fact judgment or value judgment is often expressed with a statement, which is linked by *is* or *ought*. Therefore Hume's *is/ought* dichotomy represents subjective fact and value judgment, not the objective fact and the objective reference of value judgment.

Whether or not a fact judgment could be made depends on two things: first, the object to be judged; second, the judging power or device. Once we have the object of judgment and power of judging, then we will have the fact judgment. For example, we can make a fact judgment of a flower: "This is a flower". Tree is the judged object of the fact judgment, plus the judging person (power), the two elements are necessary and also sufficient for the making of fact judgment.

A fact judgment is about what the judged object *is*. What is significant with a fact judgment is whether or not the subjective judgment indeed successfully reflects what the object really *is*. If it does, we use a positive term for the successful judgment, calling it as *true*. If it does not, we use a negative term for the unsuccessful judgment, call it as *false*. So a fact judgment is called true/false judgment. The critical point is that the criterion to decide the true or false of a fact judgment is the judged object itself, not anything beyond the judged object. Therefore, a fact judgment (F) consists only of two elements: judging power (P) and judged object (O), with O itself as the criterion for the true or false of the judgment. Hence we call fact judgment as two-element judgment.

A value judgment is not about *is* but about *ought*, not about true or false but about good or bad. For example, "It is a beautiful flower" or "He ought not to lie". In the making of such judgments, we certainly need the judging powers (P)

and the judged objects (O). Flower and conduct to lie are the judged objects in the above examples respectively. However, only two elements of P and O are not likely to be sufficient. A third element is necessary for the making of value judgment. This is because a value judgment is about the good or bad of the judged object and the judged object cannot be the criterion to decide the good or bad of itself. We need something beyond tree or the action of lying to decide whether they are beautiful or not, good or evil.

For example, you stand before a flower with your judging power but with no feelings about it nor any criterion external to the flower itself, or you are confronted with a lie but with no moral or any criterion external to the action of lying itself, then you cannot say whether the flower is beautiful or ugly, whether the action of lying is good or bad. You simply cannot make any value judgment about it at all, and the best thing you can do is to make a fact judgment: "It is a flower", or "He lies". You must have something other than the judged object. So, an external criterion (C) is essential for the constitution of a value judgment. While fact judgment is constituted with two elements of P-O, value judgment must have three elements, P-O-C; hence the name three-element judgment.

Therefore, as the criterion for good/bad judgment, it is the third element that decides what the value judgment would turn out to be. Why the third element is so important? Actually, the value judging process resembles using a measurement to measure the judged object. The third element is right the measuring meter. And the so-called *value* you make is just the degree of the judged object's fitness with the third element. If the judged object fits in with the third element, we would use the positive terms on it, such as good, virtue, beautiful etc. If the judged object does not fit in with the third element, we would use the negative terms on it, such as evil, vice, ugly etc.

If the criteria are different, the value judgments made would be different even about the same judged object. For example, given your judging power and the action of lying, you would decide that you ought not to lie to your girlfriend because you have sworn that "I will never lie to you" while some other time you decide that you ought to lie to her because you make her happier by doing so. It is the same judging power of yours, and it is the same action of lying, but you have got totally different value judgments. And the only reason is that the third elements, the criteria, are different.

Now we arrive at the constitutive difference between fact and value judgments: the two-element and three-element structures. The internal structural distinction is essential and significant, which can clear away many more problems concerning fact and value judgments. First, the ways to make fact and value judgments cannot be substituted for each other. That is, one cannot expect to make a proper fact judgment through the process of value judgment making; and one cannot expect to make a proper value judgment through the process of fact judgment making. If, for instance, one wants to make a value judgment and hopes to do it with only two elements of P and O, unfortunately, as previously said, the judgment thus made can only be that of fact instead of value. If one hopes to make a fact judgment but with a third element external to the judged object, unfortunately, the so-claimed fact judgment should be false in principle. This is because the true or false of a fact judgment is decided by the judged object per se as the criterion, and, with the third element external to the judged object, it is a wrong criterion and accordingly a false fact judgment. So a true fact judgment must necessarily be free from the third element, while the third element, as the inherent birthmark of value judgment, could be the distinguishing symbol of value from fact. "Value-free" is indeed a marvelous expression of English language to show the nature of fact judgment.

The second point is about the comparison and communication of different fact or value judgments. If there are conflicting fact judgments about the same judged object, they would have a common objective criterion to decide which is true and which is false. And this is the judged object they share. Thus, though the fact judgments are conflicting, they are at least comparable, and have the common ground to communicate and the chance for harmonization.

Conflicts of value judgments are a quite different case. Given two value judgments about the same judged object but with different third element, the value judgments will naturally conflict each other, and the conflict will be irreconcilable. If P_1 makes a value judgment V_1 (I ought not to lie to my girlfriend) about object O (action of lying) upon the third element C_1 (because I have sworn not to) while P_2 makes a value judgment V_2 (I ought to lie to my girlfriend) about object O (action of lying) upon the third element C_2 (because that makes her happy), logically, P_1 cannot disclaim V_2 while P_2 cannot disclaim V_1 . Because V_1 and V_2 are based on totally different criteria of C_1 and C_2 , they thus have no *tertium comparationis*.

If the two value judgments insist on disclaiming each other, they are not doing anything meaningful. Actually, they are making a new value judgment with the other value judgment (V_1 or V_2) as the object and their won third elements (C_2 and C_1) as the criteria. The problem is that each is using his own criterion as the ultimate that allows no further analytical consideration while at the same time gives absolute denial of the other party's criterion. Thus, the value conflicts will be nonnegotiable and irreconcilable. For example, the judgment of "Polygamy is right" based upon Islamic Koran conflicts with the judgment of "Polygamy is wrong" based upon Christian Bible. While both parties claim that the religious foundation is ultimate and not negotiable, there would be no chance to harmonize the conflict.

Thirdly, since the elements of P-O and P-O-C are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the making of fact and value judgments respectively, it depends totally on the judging person's will which judgment - fact or value - he feels like making once the conditions are met. For example, when you stand before a flower with happy feelings about it, you can either say: "It is a flower", or "It is a beautiful flower", whichever you like. Thus, the judged object, as long as it exists there and within the judging power of the judging person, is subject to both fact and value judgments. It is the judging person's decision which judgment to make and the judged object plays no part in it.

Fourthly, though we can still use Hume's *is* and *ought* to symbolize respectively fact and value judgments, we must however be aware that the two link verbs are just formal symbols and do not mark the essential distinction between fact and value judgments. For example: "This is a beautiful flower" has the verb *is* in the statement, but it is a value instead of a fact judgment. The concepts of two and three-element structures are the only way to locate the distinction in nature between fact and value judgment, with which the linguistic symbols of *is* and *ought* do not have any necessary connection.

Finally, the structural distinction between fact and value judgments should have proved the significance of itself, and a further illustration of this might therefore be welcome. I am sorry if it irritates those who hate the so-called scientism, but a wonderful analogy is indeed able to be made between the structural distinctions of *is/ought* and the molecular structures of different physical substances. Why are water and alcohol different? According to science, it is because of their difference in molecular structure: H-O-H and CH₃-CH₂-OH. Why are fact and value judgments different? Similarly, we can say it is because of their difference in the inner structure as well: P-O and P-O-C. Even, to the greater wrath of the already wrathful anti-scientists, we might say we have found the molecular structure of morality: P-O-C. Of course, it needs to be refined, but not within this short paper.

The third element

As previously said, if the value conflict stems from the different third elements they have, and people refuse any further negotiation about the third elements, it will be impossible to have any comparison and communication between the conflicting value judgments. The only way to harmonize this part of cultural conflicts is to allow further exploration into, instead of the value judgments per se, the third elements of them. Also, the third element is what makes value judgment as it is, marking its special essence from fact judgment. The sort of molecular or even atomic analysis into the third element will be helpful with deepening our understanding of value judgment.

Considering human emotions or inclinations as the third element, one can say that this is the most typical case in which the western philosophy disconnects value judgment from rational fact judgment. Why Hume (1978, p. 256-457, 470) maintains that *ought* cannot be derived from *is*, because, as he claims, *ought* is derived from a kind of sense or feelings, which is something human reason cannot capture. Finnis defends for the rationality of value judgment, but he takes the basic forms of good grasped by practical reasoning as what is good for human nature, and maintains that one grasps the good from the inside in the form of inclination. "One does not judge that 'I have [or everybody has] an inclination to find out about things' and then infer that therefore 'knowledge is a good to be pursued'. Rather, by a simple act of non-inferential understanding one grasps that the object of the inclination which one experiences is an instance of a general form of good, for oneself (and others like one)" (Hume, 1978, p. 470) Thus, value judgments are not derived from fact or anything but from the self-evident and internally-felt inclinations or ultimate values.

Though the two disagrees on its rationality, they both take basic human feelings or inclinations as the source of value judgment, which demonstrates value judgment's disconnection from fact judgment. However, given a second thought, these emotion or inclination arguments are not so sound. First, Finnis seems to have a possible risk of self-contradictions. His "non-inferential understanding" that motivates one to grasp the object of inclination as an instance of a general form of good may have two possible interpretations. These internal experiences of inclination directly trigger the action for the objective of the inclination. One does not have cognitive perception or judgment about the fact that I have an inclination to find out about things, this inclination alone generates from the inside the external reactions to find out about things. If so, the process is not only non-inferential, it is not through the human reason or human mind at all. It is just like reflexive process of any animal that motivates it to grasp his food or mate, which does not seem to have much to do with human reasonableness. Such an interpretation would conflict with Finnis' defense for the rationality of value judgment. Besides, with such an interpretation, the good thus obtained is often not good even by the criterion of the inclination's objective itself. For example, if one has dermatophytosis, he would experience the internal inclination to scratch to stop the itching. However, as it is known, the more he scratches, the worse the itching, which is just the opposite of the inclination's objective.

The other possible interpretation is that, though there is no inference process, rational knowledge about the inclination is indeed there. Probably, there is no explicit form of word or inference process of formal logic for the judgment that I have an inclination to find out about things. But the fact that I have an internal need for (the) knowledge must be within my rational perception. That is, though with no wordy form, I have perceived in a special way the factual existence of the inclination, and

it is only upon this perception of the fact of the existence of my need that I act to find out about (the) thing(s). Thus understood, the so-called internal experiences of inclination are in essence the rational and cognitive perception of fact, that is, the existence of my internal need for knowledge. And this fact judgment is working as the third element for my value judgment of knowledge. Accordingly the inclination-to-practical reasoning process is one from *is* to *ought*. This second interpretation actually means that the value judgment that 'knowledge is a good to be pursued' is not directly resulted from the pure inclination or emotion alone, but from the fact judgment of the inclination or emotion, whatever form it takes.

If the second interpretation is right, then only on the basis of true fact judgment about the inclination can proper value judgment be made. Otherwise, even when the inclination is there inside me, if I have made a false fact judgment about it, I cannot make a good value judgment. As a matter of fact, this claim has been evidenced by the author's own experiences of hunger. Hunger as the inclination for food is the feelings of the need for food, including the emptiness of the stomach. However, the author used to have severe gastritis. When my stomach was empty, I felt the pain instead of the normal feelings called hunger. At the time, the right thing for me to do was to eat so as to stop the pain. Unfortunately, at the beginning of the disease, I did not know it was the emptiness that caused the stomachache but worried that if I ate the food would hurt the stomach worse. So I decided not to eat. Clearly I made a wrong value judgment and the wrong value judgment is derived from a false fact judgment that I have made about the feelings of the emptiness of the stomach, or the feelings of hunger. So feelings or inclinations alone are not enough, fact judgment must be involved for a proper value judgment.

Some may argue that the pain I felt is not hunger while hunger refers only to the normal feeling of the need for food, which is instinctively pointing to the action of eating. But this argument actually equals human inclination to animal's instinctive neural reflex, with no human reason involved, which, as previously said, would contradict Finnis' defense for the reasonableness of value judgment. Thus hunger shall refer to the feelings of the need for food instead of a special kind of the feelings.

A more plausible understanding might be like this. The need for food is an objective and factual state while the feeling of hunger is just one form of the perceptions of this fact. People's perceptive device is composed of many parts and sense is one of them while reason is another. When one perceives the factual need of food in a sensual way, the perception he gets might be the feeling of hunger¹¹. In this sense, hunger is also the fact judgment about the objective need for food, not with human reason but with human sense. A healthy person's sensual fact judgment, the inclination of hunger, might probably be sufficient for the action to eat. However, at least for a sick person like the author, sense alone cannot make a true fact judgment of the need for food, and reason must be involved for a sound base to make proper value judgment.

Thus understood, when a value judgment is thought to be derived from feelings or inclinations, it is in fact derived from fact judgment. Though the *is-to-ought* process is not inferential, fact judgment is still internally connected with value judgment as the foundation for the latter. When the foundational fact judgment is not true, the value judgment will accordingly be not as good. Human cognitive devices may work in different ways: either from outside or from inside, either in form of reason or in form of inclination. But a principle seems to remain: value

¹¹ Of course, reason alone can also cognize the factual need for food without the sensual aid. For example, by the time of gastric emptying, blood sugar and other modern medical methods.

judgment is derived from fact judgment. The good flows from the true. The greater the truth; the greater the good.

Assuming sheer fact judgment as the third element, one can say that the above conclusion, though plausible in case of emotions or inclinations as the third elements, is fairly non-traditional. It is against the disconnection thesis of western philosophy though in agreement with the connection notion of the Chinese. And within Chinese philosophical tradition, this conclusion is also the minority in claiming an *is-to-ought* sequence instead of otherwise. It therefore needs to be further testified. However, we can sometimes find easy examples in which value judgments are derived from obvious fact judgments.

For instance, right after an international event occurs, a government spokesman is asked to give comments on it, which is the value judgment of the event. Often the spokesman might say: "No comments", or "I am not yet authorized to comment", or "I will get back to you later". Days or weeks later, the spokesman announces the attitude of his government towards the event, either to support or condemn or keep a neutral position. What happens in the days or weeks? Usually it is the process of fact judgment making. That is, the nation's government is trying to locate where the nation's interests lie about the event. Only after they have the proper knowledge about the fact of what the national interests are, can the government make their value judgment about the event, can the spokesman go away from "No comment" to "Comment".

In his *Treatise*, Hume (1978) has noticed the role of *is* in *ought*. He mentioned the improper or erroneous actions caused by the false fact judgments of passions, apples etc. But he maintained that all these errors in fact judgments do not make the according actions immoral and therefore moral virtue or vice cannot be derived from *is* (Hume, 1978, p. 459-463). Hume has actually confused different levels of value judgments here, which we will discuss immediately in the following section. Whether an action to reach out for an apple is moral or not is a value judgment in itself, with the action as the judged object and a criterion about morality as the third element, while the action to reach out for the apple is another value judgment, with the apple as the judged object and the judging person's desire as the third element. They are two different value judgments.

The action to reach out for an apple as a value judgment must be based on the apple as the judged object and the person's desire as the criterion. However, as Hume (1978) has noticed, if the judging person has got false fact judgments about the apple and about the desire, the value judgment will be based on a complete falsehood of fact judgments. The apple here is the judged object, which both fact and value judgments need. If in a value judgment, a true fact judgment about the judged object is also necessary because the misperception of the judged object will not lead to proper value judgment. That is you will find the apple is not what you expected, and the value judgment you made is a failure. So even in terms of the judged object, fact judgment seems to be the foundation of value judgment. Let alone the third element, without true information of which the value judgment made must be an erroneous action (Hume, 1978, p. 460). At the level of the action, the falsehood of fact judgment is obviously the source of the badness (negativeness) of value judgment. It proves, instead of Hume's disconnection thesis, but the connection thesis that fact judgment is the basis of value judgment, that the good flows only from the true.

Moreover, the third element can be considered as the value judgment itself since the third elements in some value judgments are not human emotions or inclinations, not obvious fact judgments, but also values. For example, John loves to drink. However, he restrains himself before he drives and says: "I ought not to

drink and drive". "Why?", asks Ed. That is, Ed wants to know the third element in John's value judgment. "Because the law says so", replies John. So the third element in John's value judgment that "I ought not to drink and drive" is the law, which is also a value judgment. If Ed keeps on asking "Why does the law say you ought not to drink and drive?", John may answer "Because drinking alcohol increases the chance of traffic accident". This is to a large extent a fact judgment.

In this case, where the third element C_1 in value judgment V_1 is another value judgment we can trace down into the value judgment of $V_2(C_1)$ to find out its third element C_2 . If C_2 is still a value judgment, we can keep on going so as to find out its C_3 . The rest could be concluded this way. We will finally find that the third element C_n in the value judgment V_n is a fact judgment.

This analytical tracking tells us two things. First, one value judgment may be based on another value judgment as its third element while it can also work as a third element to make further more value judgments. All these value judgments are related with each other but they are totally different value judgments. A division of level or hierarchy is necessary in order to have proper understanding of the relation between these value judgments. Otherwise, confusion of their inter-relations will result in fallacious conclusions. Hume has provided us a very good example. Apart from the fact judgment of the apple which provides information of the judged object, the fact judgment of the person's desire provides information of the criterion in the action to reach out for an apple. But the criterion is about what food (taste) is good, not about what thing (action) is moral. With such information, the only value judgment to be made is whether the apple is good to eat or not. Without the morality-related criterion, no value judgment concerning the moralness of the action can ever be made, whatever information one has about the apple or the desire. Thus it is ill-grounded for Hume to arrive from this instance at the conclusion that value judgment like moral virtue cannot be derived from fact judgment.

Secondly, though the value judgment at hand has another value judgment as its third element, if we keep on tracing down along the chain of third elements, it is plausible for us to find a final value judgment, whose third element is no longer an other value judgment but a fact judgment instead. If this is true to all the cases, then the more plausible conclusion should indeed be that, contrary to Hume's well-known law, the value judgment not only can be, but must be derived from fact judgment.

Analyses from the three perspectives lead to the same conclusion. The third elements in value judgments, whether they appear at the first sight to be emotions or inclinations or values per se, are essentially fact judgments or derived from fact judgments. As the third element is the crucial benchmark for the good or evil judgment, value judgment is undoubtedly derived from fact judgment. Plus the proper cognitive knowledge about the object is also essential for the making of the value judgment, we can say value judgment is, not a simple aggregation of, but a magical combination of fact judgments.

The final third element

Hold a sec! Smart people still have something to say: the previous discussions, at most, illustrate that, in some instances, value judgments are derived from fact judgments. But all these mean nothing to Hume's law because a crucial and ultimate question remains. The question is: why does the judging person take the so-called final fact judgment as the criterion for his value judgment? For example, if the value judgment that "I ought not to drink and drive" is, after analytical tracing, eventually derived from the fact judgment that "drinking alcohol increases the chance of traffic accident", there is still a question beneath the fact judgment for further tracing,

which is why does the judging person take the fact judgment as the criterion for value judgment? The core of this question concerns obviously a value instead of a fact judgment. So, whatever the answer is, the source of value judgment is still not fact judgment but another ultimate value. What are these final third elements or first principles? Are they some basic moral values? Human reasonableness? Basic form of goods? Natural law?

Internality

As previously said, value judgment is a kind of measurement to define the relation between the judged object and the third element whether or not, or how well the object fits the criterion of the third element. But value judgment is not the only way to perceive the relation, fact judgment can perceive the relation in its own way. For example, “drinking and driving endangers traffic safety”. This is a fact judgment and it is also a perception of the relation between “drinking and driving” and traffic safety. In the fact judgment way of perceiving, the judging person stands aside, taking an external view to describe the relation as an on-looking observant while having no preference or bias to either end of the relation.

Value judgment perceives the same relation in a quite different way. Instead of as an onlooker, value judgment enters into the relation to be a participant of it, and stands in the position of traffic safety to judge the other end of the relation, drinking and driving. That’s why traffic safety is the undoubted final criterion in the value judgment’s perception of the relation. Anything against the safety of traffic gets a negative judgment of *ought not*, while anything for the safety of traffic gets a positive judgment of *ought*. Therefore, from the fact “drinking alcohol increases the danger of traffic accident” as the third element, the value judgment that “one ought not to drink and drive” instead of “one ought to drink and drive” is derived.

The value judgment maker’s internal position in the relation is called the internality. Clearly, it is the internality that makes value judgment what it is. With the internality, the judging person mixes himself with one end of the relation and make it criterion to measure the other end. This decides the three-element structure of value judgment. Though fact judgment can also portray the image of the relation between the two ends, its external viewpoint focuses directly on the relation *per se* as the object to judge, without splitting special attentions to the two ends, hence its two-element structure. Value judgment, on the other hand, focuses on the two ends instead of the relation in between. As the value judgment maker is inside the relation, he uses the end of which he stands in shoes as criterion and the other end as judged object, thus giving a portrait of the relation in a runaround way.

The internality not only decides its constitutive structure but is also the original power to activate the making of the value judgment and further on the action. According to Hume (1978, p. 457), value judgment is active in that it directs the actions of the judging person while fact judgment is inactive which cannot exert any influences on acts. Actually further investigations will show that the value judgment is only the transmission shaft between the action and the engine while the real activating power is the internality hidden behind the value judgment. And if the value judgment activated by the internality is taken as the third element for more value judgments in chain, as we have previously seen, then the internality will work as ultimate drive to penetrate through all the derived value judgments from the final value judgment.

So in a human action, we find the internality as the actual motivation, while value judgment is just the relatively superficial exhibitions of the essential internality, or the technical mechanism to fulfill the mission granted by the internality. Thus

the value judgment and the motivation of act are related and separated. John loves drinking but he says "I ought not to drink now" since he is going to drive soon. Why he restrains himself from drinking? The value judgment alone is not enough, more importantly; it is because he is inside the factual relation of drinking and driving. Without the internality, solely value judgment is never sufficient to be activating. For example: although he completely agrees that he should not drink and drive, John has totally no reason at all not to drink if he is not going to drive. Therefore it is not so appropriate for Hume to say that value judgment is active while fact judgment is inactive.

So, without the internality, value judgment alone is in vain, which, just like the running wheels lifted up in the air that cannot make the car move, does not activate human actions as Hume says. On the other hand, however, once the internality is there but without value judgment, human actions will be equally effected as if there were value judgment. This is just like when the wheels have been stuck and cannot move, a car can still be pushed forward by external forces just as if the running wheels move it.

"The earth rotates around the sun", for example, is a fact judgment. It is not a value to activate human acts. But if the fact judgment is put into the factual social relation in medieval Europe, it would be taken as a value instead of fact judgment. That's why Copernicus dared not publish his book until before his death and also why Bruno was simply burnt to death. It is not only that the act that the two people thought so was taken as a vice, but the judgment per se was also taken as a vice, which means a value judgment. Why the fact judgment in essence has transformed into a seemingly value judgment is, sufficiently obvious, because of the factual social relation at the time and place¹².

The significance of internality for value judgment should be clearer now. When an internal view is taken upon a fact judgment, it can even be changed into a value judgment. This might have told us more of the relation between fact and value judgments. We have known their structural level distinction while the internal/external distinction is even more fundamental, by which the structural distinction is decided¹³.

The internality has also partially answered the question of the ultimate value judgment; it is the internality that makes the judging person to take the final fact judgment as the criterion. But questions still remain. What is this internality? Is it a sort of human reasonableness? Why does the judging person take the internal view?

The internal view of the judging person is not a subjective choice and therefore not another value judgment. The internality is a fact, an objective fact that the judging person cannot decide or choose. For example, why does one drive a car? It is because he needs (not just want) to travel and the need is prior to the value judgment about drinking and driving. Why do people live in group that they put themselves into an extremely complicated web of relations? There are many hypotheses to answer this question. It is, however, hardly convincing to take this as the well-planned rational choice of people and the answer is most likely beyond any conscious and subjective value judgment of these relations. It is the pre-value

¹² Apart from medieval Europe, similar things happen everyday even in the modern world. When a witness, for instance, gives an objective prescription of the fact that he has seen, the prescription is a fact judgment. But if the fact judgment is against the interest of a party in the case, the unfavorable party might possibly takes it as a value judgment against him.

¹³ Another example to show the significance of internality is the onlooker's value judgment. If John's close friend has died, he might show his condolence to the friend's family and say: "I know how you feel. We share the same feelings". In fact, due to the actual internalities he has, John cannot share the family's feelings. He can feel the sorrow only as a friend but not as a family member.

and pre-reason factors that activate the relation and in turn activate, together with human judging power, the value judgment of the relation and the actions under the value judgment.

So the internality is not from human reason or any basic goods; it is decided by or is in itself the pre-reason factual need or state. We may call this pre-reason fact as human nature or natural law or whatever, but there is one thing for sure: it is factual. So the internality, or the first principles for value judgments, is not human reasonableness, but the objective fact prior to any human reason, value or moral judgments. He is just internally there, like it or not, as everyone was born into a society with inevitable social relations with other people and everyone is living in the physical world with inevitable relations with the external surroundings. The internal view of value judgment is just what the judging person can see from where he is, not from where he chooses or from where he ought to be. So the final third element as the third element is a reflection of fact. It is from this final third element flow out all the value judgments V_1, V_2, V_3, V_k , now we, therefore, have no problem in saying the good flows out from the truth.

Is/ought reunification

Once inside the relation, a person has two angles of view for the perception of the relation. One of them is, of course, the convenient internal view. Since he is already a part of the relation, he just takes his position in it as the ultimate criterion to judge other persons or objects in relation with him. The judgments thus obtained are value judgments, which therefore could be taken as the perceptions of the relation from internal point of view. Human perceptive capacity is a wonderful thing, it has the ability, when the judging person is actually outside the relation, to pretend as if the person is inside the relation and thus to make a value judgment of it from an internal point of view. We may call it as the onlooker's value judgment. For example, someone who cannot drive at all may also say: "I ought not to drink and drive". Since the person will never really be inside the relation between drinking and driving, this onlooker's value judgment, as previously said, will not have any actual effect upon his acts.

Thanks to the wonderful perceptive capacity of human beings, the convenient internal view is not the only way for people to perceive the relation that they themselves are in as parts. Human perceptive device cannot only take an internal view when the judging person is outside the relation, they can do the contrary too. That is, they have the ability to take a view from outside back upon what they are inside. So they not only know "I ought not to drink and drive" but also perceive that "Drinking and driving endangers traffic". The fact judgment well reflects the relation with the two ends of drinking and traffic but without the judging person standing as a part. Thus the pre-value factual relation works as the base for both value judgment and fact judgment to be made. In this sense, we can say fact and value judgments share the same source, which is the value-free fact as the common final object of judgment. And the distinction between the two is the just the different perspectives from which to see the same object.

Now we are approaching an even more non-traditional conclusion that fact judgment and value judgment are not so essentially distinctive. On the ultimate level, they are reunified at an objective relation, the external image of which makes fact judgment while internal image value judgment. The ultimate relation concerns about the fitness between its two ends, and this fitness is right the substance revealed internally by value judgment. As the fitness relation between the two ends is objective and factual, we can therefore say that value is as objective as the

objective fact. The objective value is just the fitness between the two ends. Since this fitness is also the substance of the relation *per se*, fact and value judgments share the same ultimate essence. Thus we can even say that *is* and *ought* are essentially the same thing, but with different angles to view it. The stories of an Englishman and Newton's apple might illustrate this well.

Isaac Newton is standing in front of an apple tree and sees a ripened apple falling down. He understands that why the apple falls is the necessary result of the internal factor of the ripened apple's own, and so he says: "The apple falls when ripened". This is a fact judgment, and, if true, is an external descriptive reflection of the objective fact that the apple falls when ripened. Suppose Isaac Newton were the apple and he knew the objective fact that the apple falls when ripened, he would say: "I ought to fall when ripened". This is a value judgment, and an internal prescriptive reflection of the same objective fact that the apple falls when ripened. This is how fact and value judgments are different from and related with each other.

Some may find the imagined story weird and unconvincing. But it is easy to find in realistic human societies events of the same effect. We can quote an example from HLA Hart. A foreigner may report to his friends after his travel to England that: "The English stand up when God Save the Queen is played". This is, if true, a fact judgment, external and descriptive. However, suppose the reporter is English, he may feel: "I ought to stand up when God Save the Queen is played". This is a value judgment, internal and prescriptive. But both, though through different perspective, give certain kind of reflection of the relation between English persons' standing up and "when God Save the Queen is played".

Some may argue that here involves the confusion between natural factor in the apple and the cultural factor in human mind. But it is indeed unconvincing to insist on essential distinctions between the natural and the cultural. It is certain factors inside the apple that lead it to fall down while it is also certain factors inside the English person that lead him to stand up. At least in this sense, we cannot see any meaningful distinctions between the so-called the natural and the cultural, except the linguists' symbolic fictions. Though the factors *per se* have the differences of being natural and being cultural, but the natural/cultural differences are not subjective human constructions. Objectively, we do not have sufficient reason to say the differences between the biological factors in an apple and the mental factors in one's mind are in any degree bigger than that between the biological factors in an apple and the inorganic factors in a brick¹⁴.

Values of *is* and *ought*

So fact and value judgments are different views upon the same objective fact. Ultimately, value judgment, like fact judgment, is derived from objective fact. But value judgment is not directly derived from objective fact but through the bridge of fact judgment in between. Prior to the making of a value judgment, the judging person must first have the fact judgment of the judged object as well as the fact judgment of the third element. It is then upon these two fact judgments that the value judgment is made. Different people may have different fact judgments about the objective fact and accordingly have different value judgments made upon the different fact judgments. When fact judgment changes, value judgment changes correspondingly. That is why different cultures may mean different value

¹⁴ Some may argue that this will lead to the denial of free will. Actually it will not. The conception of free will is also a perception from the internal point of view. In fact judgment we recognize it as the acting person's own internal factor, which has covered the connotation of the concept of free will.

judgments as well as different fact judgments. That is also why the development of fact judgment promotes the development of value system and further on the whole culture.

Value judgment not only has fact judgment as its bridge to its objective relation, value judgment per se can also be the object of fact judgment. Since value judgment, once made, is also an existence in the external world, it can certainly be the object of human perception as long as it gets within the reach of human perceptive capacity. Therefore people can make fact judgment of a value judgment. The fact judgment of a value judgment principally contains the fact judgment of the judged object, the fact judgment of the third element, and the fact judgment of the relation in between. For example the idea of the fact judgment of value judgment can be of great significance to possibility of descriptive general jurisprudence, which we will discuss in detail later.

Given a judged object, fact and value judgments give different perceptions about it. The perception of a fact judgment is to pursue the information about the object per se, without that of other interfering objects. Value judgment, on the other hand, is not about the object itself, but about its relation with something else, i.e. its fitness with the third element. So whether we need fact or value judgment depends on what information we expect about the judged object. In case we want the information about the object per se, fact judgment is what we need while value judgment cannot provide the knowledge we expect.

This is essential for moral philosophy or the philosophy of value. When we ask the fundamental questions into the ultimacy or the ontology of moral goods or other values, what we want is actually the perception about the values themselves, thorough and complete. We do not want interferences; we do not want the judgment about them by the criteria of some other values. Otherwise, what we have is not the perception of the values themselves, but with impurities of some third elements; we are not at the ultimacy yet, we are still standing on the presumption of other values, which we do not expect and are not supposed to do. So, necessarily, what we need here is only fact judgment, the fact judgment of values. And, with fact judgment of value, the ultimate source of all values or value judgments, as previously proved, can only be the factual relation between a factual object and a factual third element, not any form of basic goods or values.

However, the denial of the possibility of fact judgment of value will result in certain kind of the so-called basic goods or values as the source of all the other value judgments. And these basic values are supposed to be general and universal. Due to the assumption that only the internal approach is appropriate for the perception of value, western philosophers are keen on summing up these basic values¹⁵. But none of these basic or common goods or values seems to have the generality or universality as it is claimed to have. Knowledge, according to Finnis, is a basic good for everyone, but “难得糊涂 (Ignorance is virtuous)” in China has long been the philosophy of life for many¹⁶. Life is another basic good for Finnis. But life might not be a good for those who commit suicide and who wants euthanasia. On the contrary, death is a good for them, and so it is with the martyrs and heroes.

The problem here is the internal view which is essential for value judgment. With an internal view, one must assume something general and universal, absolute

¹⁵ John Finnis' basic goods and Rawls' principles of justice are examples.

¹⁶ A Christian missionary from US told me “Use your heart not your head to approach God”, be a child, be ignorant, and throw away all your knowledge. Just as a lamb can never know the shepherd, you cannot and ought not to know God. You can disagree with the missionary, but at least to him in this case, knowledge is not a good.

and nonnegotiable, which works as the third element in the value judgment. But the generality and universality is only assumed, often it is not necessarily true. In order to have a sound third element as the criterion for value judgment, we need a fact judgment for what the third element tries to claim as fact judgment is the only way to pursue the truth not to assume the truth like those in value judgments. This is why all the theses which give credit to the so-called basic goods as the eventual foundation for other value judgments are problematic. This is also why it is only fact that can work as the foundation of value judgments.

And, as previously said, fact judgment is the bridge between the objective fact and the use of fact as the third element in value judgment, fact judgment has, in some degree, decisive effect upon value judgments made thereafter. Since people can have fact judgments with different degrees of truth, they will accordingly have value judgments with different degrees of good. The truth decides the good; the greater the truth, the greater the good.

Human reason and perceptive devices

In the process of achieving greater truth and accordingly the greater good, human perceptive devices, of which human reason is one form, plays a significant role. It is reason that works to capture the perception of the objective fact, and further on the perception concerning the good. But, nevertheless, human perceptive devices, including human reason, are only of instrumental instead of essential significance. Human perceptive devices are the instruments for fact or value judgments upon objective facts, they, therefore, can exert effects on subjective judgments, including those of fact and value, and in turn on human acts, but not on the objective fact. We have had the metaphor that value judgment between the factual internality and human act is like the transmission shaft between the wheels and the move of a car, human perceptive devices, including human reason, play the similar role between the factual internality and value judgment, which pass on the driving force from the engine to the wheels and further on to the car. Human perceptive devices are prior to human acts and judgments, but the ultimate objective fact, the engine, is prior to anything, including human reason and other perceptive devices.

Some may argue that human perceptive devices including reason, in a degree, are also part of the factual Nature. But in this sense, human reason or other perceptive devices are just like the sensory organs of animals or insects. Any subjective wills or judgments of people are just like the responses of the animals or insects to the surrounding environment, which are just part of the operation of the great Nature itself. In order to achieve in this sense a true understanding of human reason per se, without any interference from other external elements, we can only make fact judgment of it. And the conclusion thus got is already in the story of Newton as an apple and the apple as Newton, which means the proper understanding of human reason's role in value is not as a value but as a fact. Thus, given human reason as a form of perceptive device, it is also problematic, as Finnis thinks Aquinas does, to take human reasonableness as the first principles of value.

As a fact judgment aims to give a faithful picture of the object just like a camera trying to take a picture of the object, we may call the judging power in it *reflective*. While the judging power it aims to measure the object using the third element as a benchmark, we may call the judging power in value judgment *measuring*. In this sense, John Finnis is right in that they are operating in a different way, yielding a different logic, but there is no good reason for asserting one is more rational than the other. Whether reflective or measuring, they are both the human perceptive devices. The measuring process shall involve the same rational process of human

reason as the fact judgment does, let alone fact judgments per se are also involved in the process of a value judgment.

We thus arrive at our conclusions concerning *is/ought* relation: value judgment is derived from fact judgment, and further on from the objective fact. The objective fact, which is pre-reason and value-free, is the common source for both value and fact judgments, whose difference is only the different points of view upon the object fact. While the objective fact for a fact judgment may be a physical object, an intangible relation or anything else within the reach of human perception, the objective fact for a value judgment is a relation between two things, with one end of which as the judged object while the other as the third element. Human reason as a form of perception is the technique needed for the generation of fact and value judgments, but it is posterior to the ultimate objective fact.

More evidences

Though the conclusions above get some ambiguous supports from classical Chinese philosophy, they are quite contrarian for western ideas, which therefore need to be backed up with more evidences. Luckily, the evidences seem not so difficult to find.

Confucius, the great moral teacher in China, could give us wonderful illustrations as he often derived his moral teachings right from fact judgments. For example, when asked about the virtue of three years' mourning for parents, Confucius said: "It is not till a child is three years old that it is allowed to leave the arms of its parents" (*The Analects*, 《论语·阳货》). In order to give the reason why one ought to mourn his parents for three years, Confucius quote a fact that a child cannot be independent from his parents until three years after birth. Obviously, this fact judgment is the external criteria for the value judgment about what one ought to do after parents' death. Confucius is deriving a value judgment here from a fact judgment as the third element.

People may argue that this is not yet the final value judgment. The derivation (D1) by Confucius from the fact that a child cannot be independent from his parents until three years after birth to the value that a child ought to mourn for three years after his parents' death is in itself a value judgment. In this value judgment D1, there might be a hidden third element, which might be the more basic principles of filiality, righteousness, or reciprocity. These are not facts, but values, the basic values for traditional Chinese moral system. How do these basic values come? Are they also derived from facts? Now we need the analytical tracing.

But we will skip all the intermediate stages and go right to the final third element. Dong Zhongshu, who is considered as the one to establish the Confucianism's dominance in China, said: "仁义制度之数, 尽取之天" (All nomians of Jen and Yi are from Tian) (Dong Zhongshu, 1989, p. 74); "王道之三纲, 可求于天" (The three cardinal principles for King's way are from Tian)" (Dong Zhongshu, 1989, p. 74); "君臣父子夫妇之义, 皆取诸阴阳之道" (The duties between sovereign and minister, father and son, husband and wife are all from the Tao of Yin and Yang)" (Dong Zhongshu, 1989, p. 73). The answer we get from Dong is thorough, complete and fundamental. The nomians of Jen and Yi, the three cardinal principles for King's way, all the duties between sovereign and minister, father and son, husband and wife as mentioned by him here are not the specific values concerning only specific problems of life, they actually give an overall coverage of the whole traditional Chinese moral system. Therefore, the answer Dong gives here is the fundamental source for the whole traditional Chinese moral system, which might be called as the first principles in a western term. What are these first principles then? They are, according to Dong, Tian and Yin/Yang.

Now we come to the question what Tian (Heaven/Nature) or Yin/Yang is? Some people may insist that they are the ontology of both value and fact, not necessarily ultimate fact only. However, what happened later to the well-established Chinese value system does not seem to suggest a fact-to-value sequence here. Ever since the Opium War in 1840, western civilization invaded China with the help of their powerful guns. However, westerners have brought not only drugs and blood, but also some brilliant ideas about the world, among which we find science. Science is fact judgment, which, even according to the philosophy in its birthplace, is not supposed to have much to do with morals or values. However, once in China, science, in the eyes of many - if not most - Chinese people, had falsified the fact judgments about the world traditionally made by classic Chinese philosophy. Yin and Yang were thought to be made-up stories, which are illusionary and simply not true. Tian was also not what had been thought by traditional Chinese philosophers. That is, the Yin/Yang and Tian theses have been negated. But this negation is not because of wrongs in any sense of morality or other values, but the falsehood as a fact judgment. And it is the falsehood of the fact judgment that resulted in the consequent changes of value systems. Since Yin and Yang are no longer true, how can you expect people to keep on following the values that are derived from them? So, with the falsification of the factual foundation, the traditional Chinese moral system above collapsed, naturally.

A typical example could be Mr. Luxun, the probably most beloved author in modern China's mainland. Luxun said that, whenever he thought of Confucius, he would have the feelings of ridicule or disrespect (Luxun, 1973, p. 80). Why he felt so was because the *square* earth as said by Confucius has been proved to be *global* by the modern western science, and because Chinese people had been defeated by the nations of France and England which were not recorded in the "Four Books" (Luxun, 1973, p. 80). So, what's the point of having the Saint like this? What's the point of following his teachings? Besides, as a medical student, Luxun had rich knowledge of modern western medicine and science, like the chemical elements of H and O in water, like the knowledge of human body. Thus the traditional theories of Yin and Yang were convincingly falsified in his eyes. Naturally, the ethical duties between sovereign and minister, father and son, husband and wife established upon the Yin/Yang thesis were invalidated and rejected by him. And his condemn of the traditional ethics as cannibalism becomes quite understandable¹⁷.

So, Yin/Yang or Tian, even as the ontology of value, is firstly fact judgment in itself. When it is still sound and true, corresponding values are well established up above. Once falsified, the values collapse accordingly. Same can be found in the west. Moral systems in Christian cultures are based on the faith in the biblical God. And the faith, first of all, is the belief as truth in the fact of the existence of God. This might be why the simple event in the Bible of Jesus' revival three days after the crucifixion is so important for the preachers and the religion itself as the truth of the event lays down the foundation for the divinity of Jesus and further on for the existence of God, and then all the commandments and moral teachings of Christianity. Such a fact of revival is the cornerstone not only for the religion itself, but also for the value systems based upon it in all the Christian societies.

That may explain why the slightest doubt about the fact problem of God's existence will be a great horror while, on the other hand, the greatest minds in

¹⁷ Luxun is not the only example. Corrupted officials in modern China might help as well. According to a popular story from the Internet, someone asks a corrupted official: "Aren't you afraid that you will be punished and go to hell for all the dirty money you have?". "Hell? Superstitious! There is no such a thing!", said the corrupted official, "I am a materialist, and you need to learn some more science". The falsification of the fact judgment of the hell has also taken away the binding force of the traditional morality.

the west have always been keen on proving the seemingly simple truth. Descartes for instance claims that he has proved the existence of God with mathematics, the story of which always makes my Chinese students laugh. But I call for my students' attention to the significance of the simple fact judgment not only to the religion alone, but to the value systems derived therefrom, upon which the whole Christian world has been running. Unfortunately, the development of modern science seems to have eventually falsified the fact of the existence of God even in the eyes of many western people. This might be among the reasons why Nietzsche claims the death of God. But it is worthwhile to notice that what he claims is the death not the corruption of God, which is the negation of fact judgment not value judgment. As the foundation for values, the negation of fact judgment will consequently cause the negation of values. In this sense, it is obviously inappropriate to say that science has nothing to do with morality or values. It is modern science that causes the spiritual crisis shared in China and the west in terms of belief and moral values.

Perhaps the most convincing evidence for *ought* as derived from *is* is Hume's own observation. Hume observed that in every system of morality the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of God, then, of a sudden, the usual copulations of propositions connected by *is* and is not turn to be connected by *ought* and *ought not*. This observation demands our attention from three perspectives. First, it is "in every system of morality" that propositions connected by *is* and *is not* are found by Hume. Such a finding is not likely to be in favor of those who claim the disconnection between *is* and *ought*. If *ought* is indeed not derived from *is* and *is* does not have any essential function for *ought*, how come *is* can be found everywhere "in every system of morality"? The universal appearances of *is* in moral systems should show the function of *is* for *ought* and the function should be necessary and essential. Secondly, we should notice the sequence of *is* and *ought*. Why do moral philosophers always proceed with *is* first and go on to *ought* later? Why do moral philosophers establish the being of God first and then go on to the discussions about *ought* later? Can it be for anything else other than that only when the truthness of the fact judgment of the existence of God is established can people have the basis for the discussion about *oughts*? In a religious society, without the fact of the being of God as the premise, what ground shall people stand on to talk of *oughts*? Isn't this a typical evidence to prove that *ought* can only be derived from *is*, that fact judgment is the indispensable ground for value judgment? Thirdly, some may argue that God is not only the creator for the physical world but also the legislator for the moral world, God is the ultimate unification of fact and value. Therefore value is not necessarily derived from fact but can be from the value part of God. To this, I may again call their attention to the sequence of *is* and *ought*. As Hume has observed, before the use of *ought* and *ought not*, moral philosophers use *is* and *is not* first for their talks of God. This shows God appears in the system of God first as fact judgment. Even if God is the ultimate value, but the value must exist first and then can the rest derived values flow from the factual existence of it. This again shows *ought* is derived from *is*.

Hume's observation, therefore, does not seem to support but deny the common understanding that *ought* is not derived from *is*. This seems to have not been perceived for centuries, but is, however, of the first significance. As the authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and I am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is founded merely on the factual relations of objectives, and is perceived by reason.

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