filosofia unisinos | ISSN 1984-8234
Unisinos Journal of Philosophy

Filosofia Unisinos
Unisinos Journal of Philosophy
25(3): 1-17, 2024 | e25308
Nome dos editores responsáveis pela avaliação:
Inácio Helfer
Luís Miguel Rechiki Meirelles

Unisinos – doi: 10.4013/fsu.2024.253.08

Article

Realist or utopian pacifist? Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the question of war

Realista ou pacifista utópico? Jean-Jacques Rousseau e a questão da guerra

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ABSTRACT

This study offers an in-depth exploration of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's philosophy of international relations, an under-researched but crucial aspect of his political thought. We strongly argue that Rousseau understood the transformation of individuals into morally mature subjects as a process intimately intertwined with the development of a political community. According to Rousseau, this intricate connection cannot be fully grasped without considering the international society of states. The paper unpacks Rousseau's contemplations on the dynamics of war, the mechanisms of peace, and the unique attributes of states. It provides an articulate argument that Rousseau does not adhere strictly to the doctrines of political realism or utopian pacifism. Rather, Rousseau carves out a nuanced viewpoint that transcends these conventional categorizations, offering a more complex and multifaceted understanding of the interconnectedness between domestic and international politics. In doing so, the paper's analysis unveils a more thorough comprehension of Rousseau's political philosophy, its roots, and its implications. It emphasizes his recognition of the internal and external forces influencing state behavior and his forward-looking ideas about international relations that anticipated later developments in the field. By emphasizing his enduring relevance, this study positions Rousseau as a pivotal figure whose ideas continue to resonate in contemporary debates surrounding international relations, contributing to our understanding of global politics.

Keywords: Rousseau, war and peace, Abbé de Saint-Pierre.

RESUMO

Este estudo oferece uma exploração aprofundada da filosofia das relações internacionais de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, um aspecto pouco pesquisado, mas crucial, de seu pensamento político. Argumentamos fortemente que Rousseau entendeu a transformação de indivíduos em sujeitos moralmente maduros como um processo intimamente entrelaçado com o desenvolvimento de uma comunidade política. De acordo com Rousseau, essa conexão intrincada não pode ser totalmente compreendida sem considerar a sociedade internacional de estados. O artigo desvenda as contemplações de Rousseau sobre a dinâmica da guerra, os mecanismos de paz e os atributos únicos dos estados. Ele fornece um argumento articulado de que Rousseau não adere estritamente às doutrinas do realismo político ou do pacifismo utópico. Em vez disso, Rousseau esculpe um ponto de vista matizado que transcende essas categorizações convencionais, oferecendo uma compreensão mais complexa e multifacetada da interconexão entre política doméstica e internacional. Ao fazer isso, a análise do artigo revela uma compreensão mais completa da filosofia política de Rousseau, suas raízes e suas implicações. Ele enfatiza seu reconhecimento das forças internas e externas que influenciam o comportamento do estado e suas ideias prospectivas sobre relações internacionais que anteciparam desenvolvimentos posteriores no campo. Ao enfatizar sua relevância duradoura, este estudo posiciona Rousseau como uma figura central cujas ideias continuam a ressoar em debates contemporâneos em torno das relações internacionais, contribuindo para nossa compreensão da política global.

Palavras-chaves: Rousseau, guerra e paz, Abbé de Saint-Pierre.

1 Introduction: the mixed state

Rousseau's relationship with international relations, although known to those who engage with his thought, has rarely constituted an object of deep investigation, albeit with notable exceptions such as, Carter (1987), Hoffmann and Fidler (1991), Roosevelt (1990), and Ramel and Joubert (2000). Rousseau himself bears a significant portion of the responsibility, as aside from references in his scattered writings, he never proceeded to write the part of his Social Contract that would relate to international relations, despite having declared such an intention twice within his work (SC, p.470; Emile, pp. 848-849). Indeed, Rousseau's belief was that the organization of the state at a local level cannot be completed without simultaneous engagement with the organization of the international society of states, which, if left unregulated, leads even to the worst condition of all (SoW, p. 610). If the moral completion of the individual is the primary duty within a particular state, the achievement of peace at an international level is an integral goal within it, as the first cannot be achieved without the second.

This is something that Rousseau himself emphasizes when referring to the state in which the citizen is in a state that he calls 'mixed'. The citizen is therefore divided between the laws of a specific state, their own, and the violence that their state is forced to use in the natural state between states. That is, on the one hand, the citizen is no longer in the natural state as an individual, but now remains in a natural state between states as a citizen, and this constitutes the 'mixed' nature of this particular state [*état mixte*] in which he is (SoW, p. 610). And while on the one hand, they have irreversibly left the natural state after the merging of the political society through the social contract, they remain, albeit to a different degree and in a different way, vulnerable to the violence of the international society.[1] This makes this

[1] At this point, one could reasonably object that it is not the citizen who is in the mixed state, but the state in relation to other states. However, Rousseau is clear when he says that the individual is, on the one hand, under the protection of the law as a citizen, but at the mercy of the 'state expediency' as a foreigner. To address the latter, Kant introduced the third category of public law, cosmopolitan law.

situation essentially worse than if we had not drawn these distinctions between citizens and states. In this mixed state, death caused as a result of military conflict is presented as the duty of the citizen to the state. For Rousseau, this conundrum constitutes the greatest unhappiness of man. The echo of the divided self is, of course, very familiar in his work and starts from the formative division for the subject between nostalgia for an independence and innocence that has passed irrevocably and a civilization that has corrupted the mores, but also that also constitutes the only available field of the exercise of moral freedom. At the end of the *Emile*, Rousseau strongly poses the question without answering it:

> *We shall examine whether the establishment of society accomplished too much or too little; whether individuals-who are subject to laws and to men, while societies among themselves maintain the independence of nature-remain exposed to the ills of both conditions without having their advantages; and whether it would be better to have no civil society in the world than to have many. Is it not this mixed condition which participates in both […] Is it not this partial and imperfect association which produces tyranny and war; and are not tyranny and war the greatest plagues of humanity? (Emile, p.848).*

In the present study, we will attempt to present the exceptionally interesting conception of Rousseau on war and peace, based on the recognition of this 'mixed state'. We will try to argue that Rousseau's philosophy of international relations and law is consistent with his overall philosophical view. This will lead us to the conclusion that Rousseau maintains in his approach a realism, which, however, is far from the tradition of so-called political realism in international relations. This realism is evident in the way he deals with war and peace, but also in the plan of Abbé de St. Pierre. The 'mixed state' tells us that peace can only be established when war is tamed everywhere. And this is because states are not just rational actors, but they also have passions, and even stronger ones than individuals. Rousseau does not suggest a clear solution, but a warning. The state of war is not natural to man, but war is a result of peace, or rather, the failed precautions that people take to ensure lasting peace. By reconstructing his argument, any way out can be achieved firstly if states operate internally on the terms of the general will, and secondly, through slow and gradual education that always starts from the interior of a self-governed people.

2 Rousseau's method

Rousseau's introduction of the notion of the 'mixed state', places the problem on its real bases. He does not wish to present an image that beautifies man by describing him as having innate Reason. On the contrary, the image he presents is different:

> *I open the books on Right and on ethics; I listen to the professors and jurists; and, my mind full of their seductive doctrines, I admire the peace and justice established by the civil order; […] I close the book, step out of the lecture room, and look around me. I see wretched nations groaning beneath a yoke of iron. I see mankind ground down by a handful of oppressors. I see a famished mob, worn down by sufferings and famine, while the rich drink the blood and tears of their victims at their ease. I see on every side the strong armed with the terrible powers of the Law against the weak. […] And that is the fruit of your peaceful institutions! Indignation and pity rise from the very bottom of my heart. Yes, heartless philosopher! come and read us your book on a field of battle! (SoW, 3, p.609).*

Considering Rousseau's observations regarding human nature, his pessimism about the effectiveness of institutions that constitute a political community, as well as his harsh tone towards philosophers, it is reasonable to question whether Rousseau ultimately expresses a view in line with the tradition of political realism in international relations. That is, a perspective that focuses on the inevitability of conflict, the role of power and violence, while considering any reference to values as idealism and utopia.

In the above excerpt, Rousseau, as in the description of the 'mixed state', describes in a different way the tension between our identity as humans and our identity as citizens. What he mocks in the philosopher's attitude is the position about the existence of a natural community of all people and a natural sense of humanity, which is inherent and capable of grounding natural law in Reason.[2] Nothing like that exists according to Rousseau, and any appeal to the humanity within us is, as it appears from the excerpt, ineffective, not because Rousseau is a moral relativist, but because it cannot mobilize the acting subjects, let alone the states. Rousseau says: "It's not a matter of someone telling me what justice is, but of showing me why I need to be just" (SC, p.286). If it were inherent, it would not need to be taught. The same applies to the feeling of humanity. It is something that the philosophers of natural law presuppose, taking what has been socially constructed as natural. The supposed cosmopolitans, according to Rousseau, justify their love for their country through their love for humanity, arguing that they love people in general, so that they have the right to ultimately not love anyone.[3] But we become human only after we have become citizens.

Consequently, what Rousseau does is to search, as he says, for what is 'natural', rather than what arises from our prejudices, what remains constant as a valuable element when detached from the process of decay, but also poses the problem of decay itself (SoW, p.603.).[4] As in the case of the *Treatise on the Foundations of Inequality*, Rousseau's method is not historic-sociological. Let us remember that there he was not just interested in mere facts (Inequality, p.132-133).[5] That is why any objections as to whether the natural state of the primal, solitary human being with the innocence that distinguished them does not concern Rousseau. In a similar manner, in the analyses he makes of international relations and war, he does not seem concerned by objections arising from empirical examples, such as the fact that only Switzerland seems to be in a state of 'independence', without participating in a power struggle at an international level and is peaceful, nor in any alliance or union, such as that of Europe. Where does this lead us? To approach the answer, we need to examine the peculiar relationship that Rousseau maintains with Hobbes, as to a large extent his theory of international relations and war constitutes a response to Hobbes's theoretical developments about man and citizen.

3 War and the natural state

A corollary of Rousseau's assumptions is that there can be no war among people in the natural state, as he understands it, but conflict appears in a de facto society - the latter can only be identified with Hobbes's natural state. Only when people enter society do they decide to wage war against each other, so someone first becomes a citizen and then a soldier (SoW, p.602). Unlike Hobbes, he believes that whatever happens between individuals in the natural state is a casual conflict, a simple brawl that lasts a short time. However, the state of war is not a temporary situation, but a permanent one, so it presupposes stable relationships, i.e., social relationships. The same positions are reiterated later by Rousseau in *The Social Contract* (SC, Book IV). War, then, is not a natural necessity, a natural instinct for extermination due to competition and the securing of power, but a social evil, and man according to Rousseau is not by nature social.

Thus, for Rousseau, the state of war is not natural to man, just as peace is not a 'general rule of Reason' that every human must strive for to avoid war (Hobbes, [1651] 1989, p. 200). Rousseau reverses the position supported by natural law thinkers: now, war springs from peace, or, to use a less provoca-

[2] Rousseau refers here to Denis Diderot who 'reads' the existence of a common humanity in international relations when he speaks of natural law based on Reason.
[3] For Rousseau's perception of natural law, see Terrel, 2001:326-331 and Silvestrini, 2009.
[4] For an excellent analysis of what Rousseau perceives as 'nature', see, among others, Siep, 2000, pp. 53-72
[5] This position is also agreed upon by Hoffmann, 1963, pp.317-333, as well as the Introduction to Hoffman & Fidler, 1991.

tive formulation, from the measures people take to ensure their lasting peaceful coexistence and safety, once they have entered societies (SoW, p. 603). This is another one of the paradoxes that Rousseau likes to use as precise descriptions of the contradictions of reality itself. There is an analogy here between the Rousseauian critique of Hobbesian peace and the Rousseauian critique of civilization, and the analogy pertains to the critique of the same Enlightenment instrumental reason that underlies both - a critique that is later reiterated against Abbé de Saint-Pierre for his naïve persistence in logic when he formulates his plan for eternal peace. The political society, the purpose of which is to limit passions and the violence they cause through effective power, and to establish social peace and security, cannot eliminate them on its own, without other prerequisites.

This is also evident from the different treatment of violence itself between Rousseau and Hobbes. The latter, finding that the causes of conflict and violence are rooted in human nature, does not try to eradicate them, but to contain them. Entering into a political society does not change human nature, but limits its result, violence. Peace is thus self-defeating when it simply covers up passions (especially that of greed) through violence but is also founded only on a rational self-interest. The same is true in civilization, where the development of instrumental rationality goes hand in hand with the corruption of morals. But Rousseau is interested not in the result, but in the causes of war, which are social. The Hobbesian state of nature, for Rousseau, is already a pre-political de facto society, and it is bad not because it is a state of war - which is only the result - but because it corrupts the peaceful nature of man. In the Hobbesian political society all passions are preserved, albeit suppressed, except for violence and conflict among citizens which are simply contained. However, we have the addition of two evils: tyranny through the Leviathan and war (between states).

4 People and States: the legitimised war

For Hobbes, even after the formation of political societies, the state of nature, as he described it, continues, this time however between different states. However, the solution he proposes as an exit from this is not the same. This is because now the state of nature at the interstate level is, in a sense, more tolerable, although it is also characterized by insecurity and pursuit of power, which again leads to conflict, as the passions that are suppressed in individual political societies reappear more intensely on the international stage. Accordingly, the solution to exit from the new state of nature would be the entry of multiple Leviathans into a political society, which under the power of a global Leviathan would again establish peace. However, the exact same analogy does not exist between individuals and states in relation to the state of nature, because in international competition for power, the existence of the state now makes a difference. States no longer need to sacrifice their natural freedom to ensure their existence, and this is for three reasons:

In primis, states are now not as weak as individuals in the state of nature and are not at risk of extinction. Of course, there is still what is called the 'security dilemma' in international relations theory, but it is not so intense. In secundis, the very existence of the state is a shield of protection for individuals, not only against other individuals, but also against the threat of violence coming from other states. In tertiis, states have a special rational interest in not getting involved in wars of annihilation as in this way they will weaken the obedience shown towards them by their citizens. What makes Hobbes 'tolerate' the existence of a state of nature at the international level is that he ultimately believes that states have a narrow, specific interest in keeping their competition at such levels that, through the relative increase in power of all, a certain 'balance of power' is achieved, which maintains a state of relative peace. This reciprocity of interests recognized here by Hobbes also forms the basis for the development of international law, which is of course conventional. However, such a balance of power is fragile and Hobbes' optimism that we can tolerate such a situation has been disproved many times since.

Rousseau, in this sense, is more pessimistic, although not a realist in the sense that Hobbes is, recognizing the existence of violence in international society. What really separates Rousseau from the realist school is that, following the critique he has already made, he believes that war is not a natural, but a social evil. This carries a significant consequence. If a basic position of Rousseau is also the fact that it is not possible in any way for us to return to the state of nature of the primitives, then it is not possible for us to return to a pure peaceful nature of man. This has the further consequence that, as with civilization, we are within a social condition where war, as a social evil, is, whether we want it or not, a means of resolving differences and cannot be magically eliminated. In other words, Rousseau is not a pacifist. He accepts that war, because it is inevitable, can be legitimate or not - this, after all, is the correct approach to the corruption brought about by the social, not the impossible return to (peaceful) nature - but the formulation of the question whether what exists is legitimized to exist. What interests him, therefore, is not just to tell us who will reap what benefits from a war, but who and under what conditions is legitimized to conduct a war (SoW, 3, p.607).[6]

So, the issue of the legitimization of war concerns the following prerequisites: (a) war, as we said above, is conceived only between states, and not between individuals. Rousseau explains: "people are enemies only circumstantially, not at all as people, not even as citizens, but as soldiers, that is, not as members of the fatherland, but as defenders of it," and he adds that "every state can have enemies only other states and not people" (SoW, pp.601-2; SC, p. 357). This position of his is certainly not without problems. What happens, for example, with forms of violence, such as terrorism or war against it in the form it has taken today, which does not concern war between states? Is this conceived as war, so that the restrictions that he recognizes apply or not?[7] What happens when the relationship of a state and people-citizens of other states remains unregulated? Kant reserved the formulation of a third category of public law next to state and international, cosmopolitan, but Rousseau believed that it is covered by the principles of the tradition of the law of war.

(b) Rousseau tries to give a definition of war: "I call war a force used against force, the result of a mutual, stable and declared disposition to destroy the enemy state or at least to weaken it with whatever means are available" (SoW, 3, p.607). Why declared? Because for a war to be legitimized it must be declared, because this way the citizens of the enemy state are warned, otherwise it is not a war, but a robbery (SC, p. 357). Why mutual intention? Because the unilateral intention only concerns aggressive war and is not legitimized. What does the destruction of the enemy state mean? Only the destruction of the social contract, not necessarily the killing of its citizens (SoW, p. 608). Here lies an extremely interesting additional element of Rousseau's conception of ius ad bellum and ius in bello, which contains a prerequisite, which is not simply moral. If war is inevitable who can be considered to ultimately win? The purpose of the war is the destruction of the social contract. The state lives to the extent that its members desire its existence and form the general will. However, the destruction of the social contract of the enemy state is not enough to achieve peace. War for Rousseau also consists in the proposal of a new social contract addressed by the victor to the defeated people, fully testing his commitment to what he had maintained until then (Bachofen, 2015: 322). If this is not achieved, then the war has not truly been won. The real victory and the real establishment of peace is achieved when a social contract is replaced by a new one. This makes the new condition legitimized, hence the peace that will be achieved is lasting. In all other cases, we have the perpetuation of the state of war.

Accordingly, Rousseau's relationship with the just war tradition is evident in the criticism he levels against one of the classic representatives of natural law, Grotius. Grotius sees in war what he euphe-

[6] Here, the influence from the tradition of the just war that includes thinkers such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas should not escape us. The classic distinction between ius ad bellum and ius in bello appears to apply to Rousseau, but he addresses the issue somewhat integrally. For an exceptional analysis see Bachofen, 2015.

[7] For a detailed account of this objection to Rousseau's conceptualization, see Bertram (2003, pp. 68-69).

mistically calls the right of slavery. According to this right of slavery, the victor has the right to kill the defeated, so the latter can buy his life at the expense of his freedom by declaring submission, while, as he argues, this contract is legitimate as it is beneficial for both (SC, p. 356). However, Rousseau disagrees since, on the one hand, a state of war does not exist between individuals who are not naturally hostile to each other, and on the other hand, individual people cannot be 'natural' enemies of a state. They are enemies to the extent that they bear arms as defenders of their homeland, so their killing is permitted as they pose a threat. However, the moment they lay down their arms and surrender, they become people and cease to be enemies, so no one has a right over their lives (SC, p. 357). Since the purpose of the war is exclusively the destruction of the enemy state's social contract, there is no additional right that is not necessary for this purpose. Here one can again recognize the influence of the just war tradition in the principle of proportionality of means and purpose, although ultimately, as we will see, he does not fully align with this tradition.

According to Rousseau, the primary factor that leads to a state of war among nations is interdependence, which exists among different states, much like among individuals in a society. Whilst man has natural limitations regarding size, strength, and lifespan, a state, being an artificial person, can be limitless. Its size varies as it expands or contracts due to annexation or loss of territories. Since the size of the state is relative, it is compelled, says Rousseau, to continually compare itself with others in order to know itself; this creates an absolute dependency (SoW, p. 605). A state feels weak and insecure to the extent that there are stronger ones around it. Therefore, it can grow, nourish itself, and test its strength at the expense of others. Napoleon Bonaparte, commenting on his invasion of Russia, is quoted as saying, among other things: "Empires die of indigestion".[8] According to Rousseau's theory, this constant need for comparison and expansion contributes significantly to the insecurities and conflicts among states.

Rousseau's position on the plan of Abbé de Saint Pierre for perpetual peace is quite interesting. Saint Pierre proposed a plan for the unification of Christian states in Europe, which were already forming an interdependent community and in which a relative balance of power prevailed. However, Rousseau did not believe that this interdependence and 'balance of power' could create the desired harmony of peace (Extrait, pp. 577-578; Stelling-Michaud, 1964, p. 43). In fact, such interdependence leads, according to Rousseau, to the opposite result. Rousseau notes that the closer the ties become, the more violent the conflicts become, taking the form of a civil war (Extrait, p. 568; Knutsen, 1994, pp. 256-257). This is because without guarantees for the observance of peace treaties, the permanent definition of the rights of states, and given the nature and ineffectiveness of international law, interdependence produces worse results. The problem lies, thus, in the instability that can arise from this interconnectedness without the establishment of strong mechanisms to manage conflicts and ensure justice.

Rousseau finds economic interdependence to be a significant dimension of this issue. This economic interconnectedness leads inequality, yet another decisive factor for conflict. Rousseau is adamant on this point: economic interdependence breeds suspicion and conflict due to competition, and it does not bring peoples closer together, contrary to what the liberal thought of free trade would argue. The inequality that is created is of interest because its effects are much deeper here than they are among individuals. Whilst inequality among individuals has some natural limits, inequality among states does not. A state could very well absorb, both literally and metaphorically, all other states, thereby further amplifying inequalities. This perspective reveals Rousseau's critical stance on the economic dynamics of his time, which he saw as contributing to instability and conflict among nations.

Rousseau indeed stands in contrast to Hobbes, who sees equality as the cause of conflict. Similarly to the inequality brought by property ownership in a political society, Rousseau believes that inequality

[8] Rawls refers to this by saying that Napoleon was not sincere, as the true cause of decay is not indigestion but voracity. See Rawls, 2002, p.29.

among states forces them into a 'security dilemma'. As soon as the first political society, the first state, is historically formed, this fact alone is enough to provoke the formation of other political communities, thus obliging people to choose between extinction or resistance to this event, triggering a chain reaction. Even if some people wanted to remain outside of political society, they cannot do so because the inequality of power created by the establishment of the first state generates a regime of insecurity on its own (SoW, p. 603). Rousseau's analysis, therefore, points to an inherent tension within the system of nation-states, where the existence and behavior of one state can have a significant impact on others, creating a persistent state of uncertainty and potential conflict. In such a system, he suggests, true peace is difficult to achieve, and the conditions of inequality and competition only serve to perpetuate this state of insecurity.

Rousseau's pessimism stems from a deep critique of the existing political order. Turning back to Grotius's argument about the 'right of slavery', Rousseau contends that no duty of obedience binds people who have been enslaved or conquered after a war, *en contraire*, they have the right to revolt. Thus, the state of war is maintained, and any peace treaty not only does not put an end to the state of war but guarantees its continuation. In other words, the Hobbesian solution is what fuels war. Hence the paradox that 'peace' is what causes war. Any given peace is not sufficient to prevent war. Rousseau compares the Hobbesian solution to the Greeks locked in the cave of the Cyclops, living quietly, but slowly waiting for their turn to be devoured. Freedom, he claims, is the true foundation of peace, and this is not for idealistic reasons, but primarily for realistic ones.

5 The critique of the plan for perpetual peace of Abbé De Saint-Pierre

The effort of the Abbé de Saint Pierre to formulate a peace plan deeply marked the history of international relations theory, later influencing Kant himself. Rousseau, as he recounts in his Confessions, undertook at the behest of Abbé de Mably through Madame Dupin to write an epitome of his work. This is work is the source of many misunderstandings about Rousseau's own views on international relations, created by others such as Voltaire and Madison. Some of these were later dissolved in 1782 with the additional publication of his separate comments on the work of Abbé de Saint Pierre.

Rousseau, although greatly appreciating Abbé for his intentions and the sincerity of his ideas, believes that while he treated his readers as big children, he ultimately spoke to them as if they were grown-ups, judging, as he says, from the minimal effort he made to make himself understood to them. According to Rousseau, Abbé de Saint Pierre, having only logic as his passion, fell into self-deception because he wanted to make people like him, instead of taking them as they are, which made him overly optimistic about achieving eternal peace (Reveries, p. 158). Abbé de Saint Pierre's plan corresponds to what can be called a 'hierarchical model' which has specific procedural characteristics[9]:

a. Disputes between sovereign states should be resolved through mediation by an international federation, not through war.
b. The members of this international community are the sovereign states, not individuals.
c. Each sovereign state has one vote.
d. States are responsible for their own internal affairs only.
e. If the union has a military force, it can be used to suppress potential revolutions within member

[9] For this categorization, which also includes the so-called unwritten standard and the cosmopolitan standard, see Archibugi, 1992, pp.295-317. The work of Abbé de Saint-Pierre was based on a tradition that included among others, the work of Emeric Crucé, Le Nouveau Cynée (1623), the Grand Design of Henri IV (1625), and the work of William Penn, Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace (1693).

states (in contrast to modern institutions like, for example, the UN). Thus, the federation guarantees both the borders and the existing status of sovereignty for the rulers.

This model of a federation seeking the union of European states of the time is based on an analogy it maintains with the social contract agreed upon within a particular political society (Extrait, p. 564). In this sense, the 'general' utility of the plan, as Rousseau calls it, is great, because such a plan, once adopted by the sovereigns of the member states, will indeed result in peace, and all incentives causing war will be prevented by the proposed plan (Extrait, p. 580). The federation is based on the common interest and has the power to impose itself. Things change when it comes to its 'special' utility, which concerns the question of whether it is in the interest of the heads of states to agree on such a plan and whether they will adopt it. His position is clear: nothing is impossible for the plan, except for its own adoption. This is an argument that Rousseau supports by talking about human nature and the role of self-love in realizing one's particular interest on the one hand and criticizing Abbé de Saint-Pierre for his naivety and utopian rationalism on the other, adopting a realistic position at first glance.

Reiterating his criticism of philosophers' appeal to Reason, which we examined earlier, Rousseau argues that proving that peace is generally preferable to war, says nothing to someone who has the incentive to prefer war over peace. Even more so, even if we show him what the means for the establishment of a lasting peace are, all we will achieve is to provoke his opposition to it. On the contrary, we should speak in terms of narrow particular interest, dictated by how we will tame what Rousseau has called self-love [*amour propre*] (Extrait, pp. 580-581). Sovereigns will find in Abbé's plan many of their rational interests satisfied, for example, the fact that the federation guarantees their sovereignty, as well as their borders, while saving from the expenses and losses of conducting preventive wars. They therefore have every reason, that is due to their rational interest, to adopt the plan, while Rousseau admits that in Abbé's plan the only precondition is that the rulers are rational enough to perceive their true interest. Nevertheless, such a plan remains unrealized. Why? Not because it is overly idealistic, says Rousseau, but because "people are paranoid, and it is a sign of paranoia to remain rational among so many lunatics" (Extrait, pp.587-589). Thus, the rulers do not act rationally as Abbé would have hoped. On the contrary, their self-love blinds them even in terms of their true interest.

Rousseau's criticism of the instrumentality of reason brought by civilization and the narrow juxtaposition of reason and passion is repeated in his criticism of the Abbé. Abbé's mistake lies in his naive perception of the modern state internally, not because the international system of states is inevitably characterized by anarchy, although he also has a view on the latter, which we will see below. Abbé naively believes that the rulers of states are interested in glory and recognize as their true interest the happiness of their subjects, far from reality (Jugement, p. 592). Rousseau here uses the distinction between true and apparent interest, a distinction that Abbé himself had already used (Abbé de Saint-Pierre, [1713] 1986, p.36), but turns it against him. He therefore opposes Abbé's suggestion that the power of the rulers is based on their true interest, which lies in the happiness of their subjects. Re-examining the very concept of interest, he highlights the irrationality of the desire for glory and dominion. The benefits that rulers will get from adopting the Plan, economic and otherwise, are not enough to put a brake on the thirst for dominion.[10] The blindness that self-love can lead to in terms of realizing one's true interest not only hinders the adoption of the plan but makes the rulers tyrannical not only against foreigners but also their subjects by seeking war. War is what, they believe, will secure their sovereignty internally, but also their security against external enemies. In this sense, war supports their sovereignty, because under the pretext of an external enemy, they gather money and an army, which they use to oppress their

[10] Machiavelli supports the opposite in 'The Prince'. It is the common people who are swayed by the interests, and this is what maintains the rule of the prince, although Rousseau believes that he himself was "forced to hide his love for freedom" because of his connection to the Medici family, see (SC, 3, p.409).

very subjects. The relationship between war and tyranny is therefore two-way. Tyranny needs war or the state of war on the one hand, while on the other hand war or its invocation supports and perpetuates it (Political Economy, p. 268, Jugement, p. 592). In this very sense, there are no winning and losing people (as subjects) in war. Both remain prisoners of the tyranny of the rulers. We now understand better why with the formation of states two interrelated and mutually nourishing evils were added: tyranny and war.

Rousseau believes that a federation like the one the Abbé advocates would put an end to the state of war. However, the fundamental difference is that while the latter defends a union of European states, as they exist, i.e., with the respective rulers in power, and the maintenance of the status quo, the former considers necessary the internal change of states towards the republicanism of the general will. This change is also a prerequisite for any union of sovereign peoples this time, responsible for their own destiny (Carter, 1987, p. 157; Stelling-Michaud, 1964, p. 43). Because how is it possible for rulers to agree among themselves regarding the regulation of their external relations when they do not adopt such principles internally?

Based on the above, Rousseau disagrees with Abbé de Saint-Pierre that the true glory pertaining to the sovereign rulers consists in their promotion of the happiness of their subjects and the public interest. The formulation of such a social contract among the sovereigns of European Christian states cannot be based on a delusion about human nature. Rousseau attributes this naivety to Abbé, but it also points to his long-standing position about the formation of a state based on the general will, not that of the monarch. However, even internal change does not by itself solve the problem of the 'mixed state'. Self-love is not just a characteristic of rulers. It is possible for a well-governed state to conduct an unjust war (Political Economy, p. 246). The following part aims at examining the reason behind this.

6 Is Rousseau 'contemporary'?

Indeed, one could very well argue that the present reality in which we live, an era of constitutional democracies, much as Rousseau envisioned them, has surpassed the problem of sovereign rulers blinded by their personal interests. As early as Kant's time, the federation that would promote perpetual peace was voluntary and concerned republican states (Kant, [1795] 2006: Second Definitive Article).

On the other hand, John Rawls, following in Kant's footsteps, denies that today's liberal and democratic peoples (and not states) are "afflicted by what Rousseau diagnosed as arrogant or wounded pride or by lack of due self-respect" (Rawls, 2002, p. 47). While they have interests, these are reasonable, guided, as he says, by a fair equality and due respect for all peoples, which makes peace achievable.

Rousseau agreed that the subject in international society must be the peoples, who have a specific moral nature, including a sense of dignity and pride (Rawls, 2002, pp. 62-63). Now, in place of what Rousseau named *amour propre*, Rawls perceives the genuine self-respect of peoples, which manifests as equal recognition from and towards other peoples. Such a thing is, for Rawls, different from the concern for security and territorial integrity, which is characteristic of the state and not the people (Rawls, 2002, pp. 90-91). Admittedly, this is quite close to what Rousseau envisioned.

Indeed, things are not so simple. Rousseau's critique is not aimed simply at the rulers, but at all forms of political society based on self-love and instrumental reason (Williams, 2005, p.69). Thus, even if all the rulers disappear at some point, there is no guarantee that the states operating on the basis of the general will will not become corrupt, moving from the general will to the will of all, acting blindly in their apparent, circumstantial interests. Speaking of self-love in the State of War, Rousseau argues that it is in the nature of every artificial body, even in the sense of the people, as Rawls perceives it. Moreover, the relations between political bodies are much closer than those between individuals, and the interdependence is much greater, so their self-love and passions develop to a much greater degree. From the moment the first society is formed, the formation of all the others follows inevitably, and the states share borders, so they are necessarily competitive, develop rivalries and boastful behavior.

The differences of the artificial political body from the natural man, as we said earlier, provoke such a thing. But there is also something else. Rousseau criticizes those who believe that the political body is without passions and that the so-called raison d' état concerns only the *raison* (SoW, p. 605).[11] A political body, i.e. an artificial body, must be robust, and its robustness consists of the activity of its members, without which such a body becomes a dead body. And this happens because, unlike a natural body, the members cannot be connected in a way that flattens their distinctness, which is a feature of a conservative conception of organic society. This makes states, as artificial persons, much weaker in securing their self-preservation, even than the weakest human member of them. Therefore, the political body necessarily needs the intensity of passions and the power of its will, in other words, the general will and patriotism. The conclusion Rousseau draws is that only the smaller states can achieve it, compared to the larger ones, like the empires, which decay, weaken, and die. This also explains why he himself believed that democracies wage more intense wars than do rulers. So the issue is not just about rulers, but about peoples in general and that because of the 'mixed state' war is caused (Emile, p.248c).[12]

Rousseau has another reason to express a restrained pessimism in relation to his contemporaries[13], as well as ours, such as Rawls. The idea that commerce tends to lead to peace is alien to him. According to Rousseau, the trade theories of his time create such a rapid alternation of apparent interests (and here we have no reason not to extend what he says to the political body in general) that it becomes impossible to reach a stable conclusion about the real interest, seeing that everything is now based on economic systems, which are mostly paranoid (Extrait, pp. 572-573). Commercial society does not necessarily develop virtues in people because "when the goal is self-interest, it absorbs all attention [of those engaged in travel and commerce]", while commerce, which helps in the communication of peoples, also prevents them from studying each other and they learn nothing (Emile, p. 831). Rawls shares with Kant the optimism that democratic peoples who engage in trade do not get involved in wars with each other, something that is not true for Rousseau (Rawls, 2002, p. 46).[14]

And indeed when something particularly critical applies: war can be waged without human lives being taken, because what matters is not human casualties, but the destruction of the social contract itself, which forms the foundation of the community. From the moment this is destroyed, the political body is also destroyed (SoW, p.608). We thus remain in the 'mixed state'. The greater the interdependence, commercial, cultural or other, between peoples - the Europeans being a characteristic example - the harder it is to tame their self-love.

Indeed, to seek an answer to the problem as Rousseau insists on posing it, we must once again remember that we must take people (here the peoples) as they are and institutions as they can be. Also judging by the woes that interdependence and interaction bring, according to him, a strong correspondence to the internal constitution of a state is a minimalist order on the international stage. Peace cannot be achieved between states that are in any way constituted. How can this be achieved? If the argument holds that the state in which the states are both internally and as a system constitutes the real source of war, then it is doubtful what precedes: their internal change or a federation that would be a prerequisite for this very change? Because all efforts to establish a well-governed state, as envisioned in the Social Contract, are in vain if war is not tamed everywhere! The diagnosis of this paradox and its solution requires a restructuring of Rousseau's argument. To delve deeper into this, one could further explore Rousseau's understanding of peace, the nature of states, and the conditions under which they might interact in a peaceful manner.

[11] States do not possess the compassion that tames passions. What makes states "the coldest of all cold monsters" is passions, not raison d'état, as Nietzsche says [1891] 1978, pp.48-51.
[12] Waltz has argued that Rousseau's description of the structural interdependence of states, which goes beyond the human nature or the internal state-of-being, is exactly a precursor to the structural political realism that he himself supports. See Waltz, 1959, pp. 6-7, pp. 165-186.
[13] Rousseau arguably refers to Montesquieu's notion of *moeurs douces* (Montesquieu, [1748] 2006, Chapter 2).
[14] For a very enlightening analysis of the relationship between Rousseau and Rawls see Roosevelt (2006).

Indeed, Rousseau's interpretations of the state of affairs have been diverse. First, it is clear to Rousseau that the 'mixed state' cannot disappear through a fragile 'balance of power' between states, as the tradition of political realism would hope (Extrait, p. 589). The prospect of establishing a federation that could perhaps be imposed by the force of arms, with a war that would end all other wars, would not be effective either. Any such attempt is doomed to failure, as evidenced by historical examples, and it is by no means certain that a externally imposed federation would not be something to fear rather than desire (Jugement, pp. 597-598).

Secondly, if self-love can be circumscribed and transformed within a particular political society through the general will, this is not possible at the international level. The mechanism of the general will does not apply at the supranational level, as it would undermine internal sovereignty which is indivisible and inalienable. Perhaps only a voluntary federation would not cancel internal sovereignty and maintain the autonomy of a people. L. Windenberger attempted to reconstruct Rousseau's argument, suggesting that such a federation would only concern a mutual agreement arising from the distinct will of each sovereign people, hence a state of peoples is not feasible (Windenberger, 1900, pp. 204-205, 211-212). This perspective would later puzzle Kant and would only be postulated as a requirement of Reason (Kant, [1795] 2006, p. 79). Despite the fragmentary nature of the references, Rousseau rather defends the creation of federations of small states for defensive purposes. This is because, on the one hand, he agrees with Montesquieu that small states are at risk of being swallowed up if they remain on their own, and on the other hand, because federations for defensive purposes do not overthrow popular sovereignty.

However, Rousseau's problem persists. The *amour propre* of the peoples that undermines the prospect of such a federation must be tamed in order for them to perceive their true interest. Rousseau returns to the architecture of the state with the aim of telling us how it will remain independent and uncorrupted. Rousseau sees that the taming of a people's *amour propre* is subject to certain conditions, conditions that go beyond the Rawlsian description of a modern democratic people. That self-love, which brings conflict, but sometimes also expansionism in other forms, is a characteristic of many modern liberal democracies is apparent in a series of events. The foreign policy of modern liberal democracies is sometimes expressed through the refusal to sign international treaties, such as that of the International Criminal Court or the Kyoto Protocol on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but also the adoption of protectionist terms in international trade or the hindrance of the United Nations. These conditions concern (a) the size of the state and the constitution of the army, (b) its identity and morals, (c) its relationship with money and its economic independence.

In regard to the first point, it is true that Rousseau recognizes the undeniable reality, but also the necessity of the pluralism of states. The necessity of state pluralism lies in the fact that only small-sized states can be republican, that is, with citizens who participate equally, while large-sized ones deteriorate and evolve into tyrannies. States must be small in size because only in this way does the general will work with citizens who have both the power to influence decisions and the ease to control. Indeed, Rousseau wants to establish the spirit of a democratic state in such a way in the hearts of citizens that the power of the community makes them ignore the power and ambition of their neighbours, acting preventively. As he says, ambitious neighbouring peoples would not be prevented from devouring the state, but it would be very difficult for them to digest it (Poland, pp. 959, 969-970). Similar to this is that the small-sized state must have not a professional or mercenary army, but a national one, consisting of citizens who become soldiers out of duty. The national army is doubly preventative: towards the outside, ardently defending its popular sovereignty, and towards the inside, ardently defending its freedom, thus also preventing its usurpation by the ruler (Poland, pp. 1012-1019).

Regarding the second point, Rousseau understands the development of the state (and the people) as he describes in the education of Emile. This education must be negative and not positive, in the sense that it should prevent the creation of defects, and not follow dogmatism. Thus, in regard to a people, their nurture and upbringing should be simple so as not to arouse desires and make them vain. Manners

should be simple and tastes healthy with a militant spirit without ambition (Poland, p.1001). Defending the republican virtue of the citizen, he emphasizes patriotism and the cultivation of a 'national character', as he does, for example, in the advice he addresses to Corsica and Poland, and is clear that within the political community, citizens are formed with a moral personality and peculiar habits that make the homeland dear and create a natural aversion to any external interference (Poland, pp. 913-914).[15] The general will works better in this way, while the feeling of pity is activated only within a certain context. The latter evaporates when we overlook our patriotic duties and adopt the abstract perspective of humanity: "Distrust those cosmopolitans who go to great length in their books to discover duties they do not deign to fulfill around them. A philosopher loves the Tartars so as to be spared having to love his neighbors" (Emile, p. 254). Peace could prevail, when small in size, republican and independent states, infused with patriotic pride, but not nationalist vanity, are created. The distinction between the two is accurately drawn. Finally, regarding economic self-sufficiency and the relationship with money, Rousseau appears much more concise. Anyone who depends on another, and does not have his own means of subsistence, cannot be free. Thus, alliances and agreements may link the weak to the strong, but never the strong to the weak. The dependence between peoples should be limited. Therefore, for a state to be free, it must be self-sufficient, that is, not to base its economy on international trade which multiplies needs, and therefore dependence, creates vanity and makes money corrosive of manners. Rousseau is clear in his advice to the inhabitants of Corsica and Poland. Here the problem is not money itself, his criticism is not a product of a conservatism that calls for a return to a barter society, but the accumulation of wealth that corrupts and money makes possible, while on the other hand it is agriculture that ensures not only self-sufficiency but also austerity and virtues useful to the citizen. The accumulation of money can lead to extreme inequality, which leads to the buyout of the destitute. That is why trade can irreparably corrupt (Poland, pp.1003-1006).

After all this, it would be a mistake to assume that ultimately Rousseau is a proponent of a conservative isolationism and a world that consists not of cosmopolitans, but simply good citizens (Hoffmann, 1965, p. 43; Ypi, 2008). Given the systemic interdependence of states, an argument for isolationism would imply that Rousseau is content with the existence of the state of nature among states at an international level, which, as we have seen, is not true. In contrast to political realism, the conduct of war is governed by moral rules.

It would be a mistake to conclude that the critique of certain forms of cosmopolitanism, such as moral cosmopolitanism and commercial cosmopolitanism, amounts to rejecting every other version of it. Instead, Rousseau defends a version of rooted cosmopolitanism, which could form the basis for exiting the 'mixed state', but this is the subject of an educational theory, as the one followed by Emile. This type of version argues that a genuine cosmopolitanism is compatible with a republican patriotism, as the former is an extension of the latter in the form of concentric circles that establish duties at various levels. This evolutionary process of Emile's education is not an education focused on abstract notions of duty towards humanity in general but starts from oneself and the immediate environment to the homeland and ultimately embrace humanity through the neutralization of self-love. Rousseau does not deny that the duties of man precede the duties of the citizen (Emile, p. 246). However, he argues that the former are taught only after we have acquired the status of citizen. We learn to be human after we have become citizens. In the first draft of The Social Contract, he clearly argues that the status of citizen, establishing for the first-time relations of mutual trust, also makes possible for the first time the behavior towards non-members of a political community in terms of justice that apply internally. Patriotism does not equate to nationalism, but for the first time outlines the possibility for man to cultivate Reason and morality (CS, p.329).

[15] Rousseau is frequently accused of his alleged nationalism something that appears rather unsubstantiated. For more on this see Cohler, 1970, Smith, 2003.

7 Conclusion

Rousseau is neither a political realist nor a utopian pacifist. Rousseau cannot be a proponent of political realism, even though he differs in terms of the relationship between passion and reason within the Enlightenment. His critique of culture and the corruption of morals initially makes him a pessimistic recognizer of reality, not because passions and reason are in constant conflict, but because their involvement in the modern constitution of the subject, individual and collective, produces self-love and instrumental reason. However, Rousseau refuses to claim that the self-love he diagnoses is something natural, as he believes that it does not describe the unchanging nature of man. On the contrary, by explaining how it has historically developed, he also shows the direction towards its overcoming. That is why he does not embrace the view of realists or neorealists that states are rational actors and nothing more, and that there is a predictable logic of state reasons (Hassner, 1997, p. 200). This argument has been consistently made in the relevant literature by the works of Knutsen (1994), Roosevelt (1990), Williams (2005, pp.65-66), Bachofen (2015), and Falaky (2016). Rousseau's pessimism is evident, however, not enough to be characterized as a proponent of political realism. Since the return to the 'golden age' of the state of nature is not possible, and war is a social evil, he points in the direction of internal change of states, part of which is the discussion about just war. Therefore, we should not transform his pessimism into cynicism.[16]

Some will insist that the supposed solution that Rousseau promotes is utopian as it proposes a world with small, self-sufficient states in small federations as a feasible solution to the problem of war, given that, as we observe today, the interaction between states across the globe is inevitable. In one sense, for states to learn to be self-sufficient and not engage in competition, they must be isolated. But this cannot happen. However, it can be regulated. War, or more accurately, the state of war is ultimately for Rousseau the result of a failed social framework for ensuring peace and is a social, not natural, evil. As such, it is subject to moral rules of legitimization when it becomes inevitable due to the existence of states. He may not be a pacifist himself, which would be in the realm of utopia with the return to a state that we have irretrievably left as a species, but he clarifies for us that when the declaration and conduct of war does not meet certain prerequisites, it degenerates into mere robbery. His first significant contribution is, as he himself says, "[…] at least, to making it impossible that injustice and violence should impudently usurp the names of Right and justice" (SoW, 3, p.610). The second significant contribution is to show how law-abiding states can approach their true interest, which is the coexistence of federations.

The complexity of Rousseau's thought does not allow for easy categorizations. After all, it is he himself who stubbornly refused any inclusion in groups, with the culmination of his conflict with the Encyclopaedists. That is why the answer to the question of how 'contemporary' Rousseau can be is both difficult and extremely interesting. Rawls characterizes his own theory of international relations as a 'realist utopia' saying that it shares this with Rousseau's theory. I think the characterization is absolutely apt albeit with a significant difference. Rousseau considers it more difficult to tame the self-love of states and is more cautious regarding the size of the state, its economic self-sufficiency, and the corrosive role of money accumulation – all elements being absolutely modern. However, both agree that any exit from the 'mixed state' begins by acting locally, even though our thought can operate under the prism of humanity, with the deepening of freedom and democracy internally. This is something that cannot be imposed from the outside but cultivated slowly and gradually.

Rousseau does not provide a solution regarding war and peace, and the Gordian knot of the 'mixed state' does not seem to be untangled. His analysis has more the character of a warning (Hassner, 1997,

[16] Rousseau's position regarding the optimism that characterizes philosophers such as Leibniz and Pope, who proclaimed that our world is the best of all possible worlds, is evident from his response to Voltaire regarding the earthquake in Lisbon. See Williams, 2005, p. 71, and Cassirer, 2001, pp.50-58.

p.204). Given that states have their own unique characteristics as artificial bodies, commerce, inequality, and interdependence make any peace effort more than fragile. The 'mixed state' expresses the tension between our status as humans and as citizens. We cannot be citizens if we are not humans, but to become humans, we must first be proper citizens. Thus, the war and the warning it sends us comes from the hasty, superficial, and therefore error-prone, attempt to reconcile the two.

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Submetido em 13 de julho de 2023.

Aceito em 01 agosto de 2024.